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The goal of the literature on reputation e®ects is to provide equilibrium char-
acterizations for games in which there is some uncertainty relative to the utility
function of a player. The purpose of this dissertation is to study the conditions
under which this kindof reputational argument can be applied to frameworks that
are interesting for their economic applications.
Chapter 2 considers a repeated game betweena long run player and a sequence
of short run players who are alive for one period only and therefore do not care
about the future. When the stage game is allowed to be a sequential move one, if
a short run player does not expect the long run player to play in a certain way, he
might choose an action that does not reveal the strategy chosen by the long run
player. Chapter 2 introduces a perturbation on the type of the short run players
that guarantees that all informational nodes of the stage game are visited with
strictly positive probability on any equilibrium path. This assumption is shown
to be su±cient for the long run player to be able to establish a reputation for
repeatedly playing any particular stage game pure strategy
viiiChapter 3 studies reputational arguments inrepeated games between apatient
player (player 1) who tries to establish a reputation against a patient opponent
(player 2). In such a case it is possible that player 2's play might prevent player
1 from establishing an appropriate reputation. The assumption that the action
chosen by player 2 is not perfectly observed by player 1 is shown to have very
strong implications for equilibrium characterization, in particular in the case in
which player 2 is su±ciently patient. In this case it is shown that an arbitrarily
patient player 1 can guarantee himself an equilibrium average discounted payo®
which is at least equal to the highest payo® from a correlated strategy subject to
the constraint that player 2 gets at least his pure strategy minmax payo®.
Chapter 4 turns attention to dynamic games (i.e. to games in which current
payo® opportunities depend on the past history of the game through a state
variable, such as capital or debt) between a large player and a continuum of small
players. When the small players have a ¯xed discount factor while the large player
is arbitrarily patient, it is shown that in any Nash equilibrium the large player
is guaranteed at least the optimal commitment payo®. The case in which both
the large and the small players are arbitrarily patient is then analyzed and it
is shown that the large player will only be able to exploit his reputation if the
transition function is reversible, in the sense that players can move from one state
to another only if they can also return. An example shows how the failure of
this condition in the durable goods monopoly problems prevents player 1 from
successfully establishing a desirable reputation.
ixChapter 1
Overview
1The literature on reputation e®ects studies the implications for equilibrium
behavior of a possibly small amount of uncertainty relative to the preferences of
one player. The general idea ¯rst introduced by Fudenberg and Levine (1989) is
that if a player's utility function is not known, he has the option of imitating the
play of a player with a utility function di®erent from his own in order to convince
his opponents that he will play in a certain way, or in other words, in order to
establish a reputation for a desirable behavior.
Most of the literature on reputation e®ects to date has concentrated on the
analysis of repeated simultaneous games between a long run player (a player who
lives forever and cares about the future) and a sequence of short run players
(who are alive for one period only), in which the long run player can establish a
reputation for a particular behavior.
The purpose of this dissertation is to study how this general argument can be
applied to frameworks which are interesting for their economic applications
Chapter 2 addresses the problems arising when stage game is not a simulta-
neous move game but a sequential one. In this case the long run player might be
prevented from building a reputation since, if the short run players do not expect
him to play in a certain way they might play an action that does not \reveal"
the long run player's strategy. A point in case is the Quality Game in which a
short run player has to decide whether to buy a product or not and the long run
player has to decide whether to produce a high quality or a low quality product,
but the quality of the product is revealed only if a purchase occurs. If the short
run players do not expect the long run player to produce a high quality product
they will not buy and the long run player has no way to establish a reputation for
producing high quality products.
In order to avoid this problem Chapter 2 introduces a perturbation also on
2the types of the short run players, so as to guarantee that on any equilibrium
path all informational nodes of the stage game are visited with strictly positive
probability. This allows the long run player to establish a reputation for the so
called Stackelberg strategy (the strategy that maximizes his payo® subject to his
opponent playing a best response) which guarantees him the Stackelberg payo®. It
is ¯nally argued that since the long run player can always establish a reputation
for such a strategy and therefore obtain the corresponding payo®, he has to get
at least this much in any equilibrium.
Even though Chapter 2 introduces a perturbation on the types of the short run
players, the crucial point is to make sure that all informational nodes of the stage
game are visited with strictly positive probability on any equilibrium path. In
this sense the main point of Chapter 2 is that introducing a perturbation on the
informational structure of agame can be bene¯cial to a long run player who might
want to establish a reputation.
This point is a general one and is pursued in Chapter 3 in which reputation
e®ects are studied in a repeated game between two patient (long run) players.
Trying to establish a reputation against a patient opponent, a player can run
into a problem similar to the one observed for a sequential move stage game. As
Schmidt (1993) pointed out, the nature of the problem is twofold: ¯rst of all, a
patient player cares not only about his opponent's current play but also about his
future one; second, a player might believe that if he does play a best response to
his opponent's expected play, then he will be punished thereafter.
Schmidt (1993) solved the problem considering a particular class of games,
games of con°icting interests with respect to player 1, in which player 2's best
response to player 1's static Stackelberg strategy gives player 2 his minmax payo®.
Chapter 3's goal is toprovidean equilibrium characterization of amore general
3class of games. This is done pursuing the idea introduced in Chapter 2 of intro-
ducing a perturbation on the outcomes of player 2's actions. This perturbation
makes sure that all ¯nite length histories occur with strictly positive probability.
Under the assumption that there exist with strictly positive probability types of
player 1 that are committed to strategies that depend only on histories of ¯nite
length, player 1 is allowed to establish a reputation for any such strategy.
The implications of the above assumptions are shown to be very strong. First
of all Schmidt's (1993) result is shown to be a special case of this more general
model. Moreover the result is valid for all ¯nite stage games once the perturbation
on the outcome of player 2 is introduced. Finally and more importantly, the
equilibrium characterization for games which do not have con°icting interests is
stronger than the one proposed by Schmidt (1993), since the optimal strategy
to commit to is not a ¯xed action (the static Stackelberg strategy) but it is a
history (and in particular time) dependent strategy. It is shown that, if player 2
is su±ciently patient, then an arbitrarily patient player 1 can guarantee himself
the highest payo® from a correlated strategy subject only to the constraint that
player 2 gets more than his minmax payo®.
Two interesting applications of the general model discussed in Chapter 3 are
a repeated game between two patient players, in which player 2's trembles make
sure that the outcome of his action is not perfectly observed, or a repeated prin-
cipal agent model with the usual assumption of invariance of the support of the
distribution over outcomes as a function of the action chosen by the agent. In the
latter case, the implications of the model presented are shown to be very strong,
since the principal can establish a reputation for making payments which depend
not only on the current outcome but also on the past history of the game, thus
inducing the ¯rst best e®ort level on the agent's side, while appropriating all the
4net surplus.
Many economic problems have the feature that a state variable such as capital,
debt or money, provides a link between present actions and future payo® oppor-
tunities. As an example, games that describe the strategic interaction between a
government and households usually involve state variables. It is in this context
that the problem of time consistency of optimal government policy arises: since
ex-ante and ex-post optimal policies di®er, even a benevolent government may
not be able to achieve the optimal commitment outcome.
Chapter 4 turns attention to this kind of problems to consider a general class
of dynamic games with one large player and a large number of small players, i.e.
to games in which current payo® opportunities may depend on the history of the
game through a state variable.
As in the previous two Chapters, the large player has some private information
about his type, i.e. the small players are uncertain about the type of large player
they are facing. This uncertainty may be very small in the sense that the large
player is of one particular type with a probability close to one.
The goal of Chapter 4 is to study the conditions under which the usual repu-
tational arguments can be extended to a dynamic game, and the conditions under
which reputational arguments fail.
Since games with a large number (continuum) of small players will be con-
sidered, it will be assumed that the individual play of the small players is not
observed. In a purely repeated game this assumption would imply that each
small player behaves like a short-lived player, since his actions will a®ect neither
his future payo®s nor the public history of the game. In a dynamic game the
presence of state variables creates an intertemporal link and introduces a new
strategic dimension to the problem. Even though a small player cannot in°uence
5his opponent's future play, he can change the value of his individual state variable,
thereby a®ecting his own future payo® opportunities. Therefore a small player's
behavior will depend on the (expected) future actions of the large player
As is clear, the presence of state variables makes it more di±cult for the large
player to establish a reputation: small players have to become convinced that the
large player will follow a particular strategy not only in the current period but
also in the future. The more the small players' behavior is a®ected by play in the
distant future the harder it will be for the large player to gain from establishing
a reputation.
The ¯rst result of Chapter 4 applies to the case where the small players have
a ¯xed discount factor while the large player is arbitrarily patient. If there is a
commitment type that plays the strategy to which the large player would want to
commit then in any Nash equilibrium the large player is guaranteed at least the
optimal commitment payo®.
The case in which both the large and the small players are arbitrarily patient
is particularly relevant for policy games, in which, for example, the payo® function
of the government is equal to the payo® function of the median voter. Then, if
players are very patient, the small players' action may be a®ected by very distant
future outcomes.
In this case it is shown that the large player will only be able to exploit his
reputation if the transition function is reversible, in the sense that players can
move from one state to another only if they can also return.
This condition is satis¯ed in capital accumulation games, but is not satis¯ed,
for example, in the standard durable goods monopoly. Once a customer has pur-
chased the durable good, he has reached an irreversible state. An example shows
how in the durable goods monopoly reputational arguments fail to guarantee the





Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) have provided an
explanation of the chain store paradox, assuming that there is a \chance" that
the incumbent is a commitment type: this fact can be exploited by a \sane"
incumbent that can therefore build up a reputation for toughness.
Fudenberg andLevine (1989) buildupontheseresults toprovidealower bound
on the Nash equilibrium payo®s of the long run player. However their main result
(Theorem 1) applies only to games in which the commitment strategy of the long
run player is revealedregardless of the strategies the short run players choose: this
is true in simultaneous move games, in sequential move games in which the long
run player moves ¯rst, and in some sequential move games in which the short run
player moves ¯rst: an example of this last class is the chain store game, in which
the strategy the short run players choose before the reputation is established is
exactly the one that reveals the strategy by which the long run player builds up
his reputation.
Fudenberg and Levine (1989) also provide a generalization ofTheorem 1 (The-
orem 2) in which the Stackelberg payo® is rede¯ned to keep into account the fact
that the outcome of the stage game may not reveal the long run player's strategy;
the new bound is computed making use of the fact that the observed outcome
of the stage game in general restricts a subset of the strategy space to which the
strategy chosen by the long run player must belong.
Unfortunately, in somegames this result does not providea higher lower bound
thantheminimumpayo® for the longrunplayer. For example, considerthequality
game with extensive form as inFig. 1. The shortrunplayermoves ¯rst and decides
whether to buy a product or not; if he decides not to buy, the game ends and
both players get 0; if he decides to buy, the long run player decides whether to
9produce a low quality product, thus making a larger pro¯t and causing the short
run player a loss, or a high quality product, in which case the pro¯t is smaller but
the short run player's payo® is positive.
Whenthis stage game is repeated anin¯nite number of times, the lower bound
provided in Theorem 2 in Fudenberg and Levine (1989) is just 0: if the prior
probability that the long run player is committed to high quality is less than :5,
there is an equilibrium in which no short run player ever buys, no information is
revealed, and the long run player payo® is 0 (cfr. Fudenberg and Levine (1989),
pp. 772-773).
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a di®erent generalization of Theorem
1 in Fudenberg and Levine(1989), one thatuses perturbations of the original game
with the property that every information set is reached with positive probability
in the stage game.
The idea is simply to assume that not only the type of the long run player
is uncertain, but also the types of the short run players are, and that for each
strategy there exists at least one type of short run player, that is selected with
strictly positive probability, that has that strategy as a strictly dominant strategy.
As is shown in Example 1, this might require a substantial increase in the
number ofperiods necessary tobuild up areputationwithrespect tothe sequential
move game, but may nevertheless provide a signi¯cantly higher lower bound on
the Nash equilibrium payo®s of the long run player.
As in Fudenberg and Levine (1989) we provide a lower bound on the Nash
equilibrium payo®s to the long run player by computing a lower bound on the
payo® to the so called Stackelberg strategy to be de¯ned. This strategy need not
be the optimal one for the long run player, but since it is always feasible, the
optimal strategy has to yield at least as high a payo®.
10Ourresultholdsfor any stage game(simultaneous move1 orsequential move)in
which the realized actions of the long run player are observed, and the probability
distributions over types of long run and short run players have full support.
Fudenberg and Levine (1991) show that there is a lower bound on the Nash
equilibrium payo®s to the long run player also when the public outcome of the
stage game is a random variable that provides only stochastic information about
the strategy the long run player chose.
Our model is a special case of theirs in that in sequential move stage games
in which the short run player moves ¯rst the public outcome only reveals the
action of the long run player and not his strategy. Restricting to this special class
of games, however, lets us explicitly compute the lower bound, and thus narrow
down the set of equilibrium payo®s to the long run player.
The range of applications of our result is very wide. In the following we just
want to mention a few applications of the quality game.
International loan contracts are many times not enforceable or very costly to
enforce. They are therefore well described by the quality game: an international
lender decides whether to give credit to a foreign agent and the latter then decides
whether to repay the loan or renege on his debt. Even though repaying is sub-
optimal in the stage game, it is a way of establishing a reputation for repayment
that in turn guarantees prolonged access to international loan markets.
Illegal contracts are also not enforceable: nevertheless cocaine dealers or illegal
lottery organizers can decide to sell high quality cocaine or to pay the prizes in
order to establish a reputation for \honesty".
Importers usually get short term credit from their suppliers. In some less
1For simultaneous move stage games our result coincides with that of Fudenberg and Levine
(1989).
11developed countries, however, trading houses do not enforce these contracts, so
that the importer has an incentive to renege on it and, by backward induction,
foreign traders refuse him credit. Also in this case, however, the importer can
guarantee himself a higher discounted payo® in the repeated game by establishing
a reputation for repayment.
In Section 2.2 we describe the game and introduce the notation. The result
is derived in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 provides two examples of the quality game
that give substance to the results of the previous section. Section 2.5 provides a
discussion of the result.
2.2 The Model
A long run player (player 1) plays a ¯xed stage game against an in¯nite sequence
of short run players (player 2). The long run player chooses a strategy s1 from a
¯nite nonempty set S1 and the short run player chooses an action s2 from a ¯nite
nonempty set S2. The corresponding mixed strategy spaces are denoted by §1
and §2.
The public outcome of the stage game is given by a mapping y : S1£S2 ! Y,
and is to be interpreted as the revealed actions of the long run and the short run
player. When the stage game is simultaneous move or sequential move with the
long run player moving ¯rst, the action reveals the long run player's strategy. But
when the stage game is sequential move and the short run player moves ¯rst the
long run player's revealed action does not reveal what he would have done, had
the short run player chosen a di®erent strategy.
The unperturbed stage game is described by the payo®s to the long run and
the short run players, a mapping u : Y ! R2; with an abuse of notation we let
12u(y(¾)) = (u1(y(¾1;¾2));u2(y(¾1;¾2))) denote the expected payo® corresponding
to the mixed strategy pro¯le ¾. In the unperturbed repeated game the long run






Each period's short run player maximizes that period's payo®, ut
2.
Both long run and short run players can condition their play on the past
history of the game. Let Ht = Y t denote the set of possible histories of the game;
then mixed strategies are mappings ¾t
1 : Ht¡1 ! §1, and ¾t
2 : Ht¡1 ! §2.
Let B : §1 ! §2 be the correspondence that maps mixed strategies by the
long run player in the stage game to the best responses of the short run player.

























2 is the strategy of the short runplayer that the long run player wants
to induce.
In the perturbed game the payo®s of the long run player, as well as those of
the short run player, are made dependent on their types which are assumed to be
private knowledge. For simplicity we assume that there are a countable number






The payo®s are therefore a mapping ui : §1 £ §2 £ -i ! R, and the mixed
strategies are mappings ¾t
i : Ht¡1 £ -i ! §i. We let !0
1 and !0
2 be the rational
players; in other words we assume that their payo®s are as in the unperturbed
game: ui(¾1;¾2;!0
i) = ui(¾1;¾2), i = 1;2.
The priors on the types are probability distributions ¹1 : -1 ! [0;1] and
¹2 : -2 ! [0;1] that are assumed to be common knowledge.
For all s1 2 S1 let !i(si) be a type of player i = 1;2 that has strategy s1
as a dominant strategy in the repeated game. In the following we will make the
following assumptions about the types of long run and short run players:
Assumption 1 There exists a ¹ ¹1 > 0 such that ¹1(!1(s1)) > ¹ ¹1 for all s1 2 S1.
Assumption 2 There exists a ¹ ¹2 > 0 such that ¹2(!2(s2)) > ¹ ¹2 for all s2 2 S2.
In the following we will call a Stackelberg leader type a long run player that has s¤
1
as a dominant strategy in the repeated game, and we denote by !¤
1 the event that
the long run player is such type, and by ¹ !¤
1 the event that the long run player is
not such type. We will denote by !
j
2 the event that the short run player is the
type that has s
j
2 as a dominant strategy.2.
Let H¤ be the set of histories such that the play of the long run player is
consistent with the description of the Stackelberg type for all t, and let h¤ denote
the event h 2 H¤. Finally, let ¼¤




t · ¹ ¼) be the random variable denoting the number (possibly in¯nite) of the
random variables ¼¤
t for which ¼¤
t · ¹ ¼.
2Less strong assumptions about the types of short run players can be made; see Section 2.4.
142.3 The Result
First we show that Pr(!¤
1jht) is nondecreasing in t when ht is the truncation of a
history h 2 H¤.
Lemma 1 For any in¯nite history h 2 H¤ such that the truncated histories ht
have positive probability, Pr(!¤
1jht) is nondecreasing in t.













































which is trivially satis¯ed since Pr(y(s¤
1;s2)j!¤
1) = 1. 2
The following Lemma computes an upper bound on the probability that the
probability that the long run player plays s¤
1 is less than a ¯xed probability ¹ ¼
when the stage game is repeated a number of times, and is to be used to compute
the lower bound on the Nash equilibrium payo®s to the long run player. In the
following we will assume that the cardinality of S1 is N +1 and will denote by [.]
the operator integral part ([x] is the greatest integer less than or equal to x).
Lemma 2 Let 0 · ¹ ¼ < 1. Suppose that (¾t
1;¾t
2) are such that Pr(h¤j!¤
1) = 1. Let
K1 = [log¹ ¹1=log(1¡ (1¡ ¹ ¼)=N)] +1, and 8² > 0 let
K2(²) = [log(1¡ (1 ¡²)1=K1)=log(1¡ ¹ ¹2)] + 1:
15Then, 8² > 0, Pr(n(¼¤
t · ¹ ¼) > K1 ¢ K2(²)jh¤) · ².
Remark 1. The purpose of Lemma 2 is to provide an upper bound on the
probability that the probability that the long run player plays s¤
1 is less than a
given ¹ ¼ 2 [0;1) after the stage game has been played a given number of times,
and to make this upper bound dependent on ¹ ¹1, ¹ ¹2 (the lower bounds on ¹1 and
¹2) and ¹ ¼ only, and otherwise independent of (-1;¹1) and (-2;¹2). To do this
we argue that whenever ¼¤
t = Pr(st
1 = s¤
1jht¡1) is low, if s¤
1 is played, there is
a strictly positive probability that Pr(!¤
1jht) increases by a nontrivial amount.
Since Pr(!¤
1jht) has to be less than or equal to 1, this cannot happen too often,
so that the probability that ¼¤
t is low in many periods has to be low.



















1) = 1 in the numerator of the previous fraction












1) ¸ ¹ ¹1.
Pr(y(s¤
1;s2)jht¡1) is the probability that y(s¤
1;s2) is observed, which is equal to
the probability that s¤
1 is being played plus the probability that other strategies
observationally equivalent to s¤
1 for s2 are being played. De¯ne S¤
1(s2) as the
set of strategies of the long run player di®erent from s¤
1 that are observationally
equivalent to s¤
1 when the short run player plays s2, i.e. S¤
1(s2) = fs1 6= s¤
1 :
y(s1;s2) = y(s¤






















1 = s1jht¡1) < 1¡ ¹ ¼: (2.6)
Given that the cardinality of S1 is N + 1, a su±cient condition for (2.6) to be
satis¯ed is Pr(st
1 = s1jht¡1) < ~ ¼ for all s1 6= s¤
1, where ~ ¼ = (1 ¡ ¹ ¼)=N.
Now suppose 9s1 6= s¤
1 such that Pr(st
1 = s1jht¡1) > ~ ¼. Since s1 6= s¤
1, there
exists an s2 such that s1 is not observationally equivalent to s¤
1, s1 62 S¤
1(s2) (in
other words, y(s1;s2) 6= y(s¤
1;s2)). If the short run player plays such an s2 (an







since the denominator of (2.5) is less than or equal to 1 ¡ ~ ¼. In the following we
will call such an s2 an information revealing strategy.
If the stage game is repeated K times and every time an information revealing








1jht) · 1 (2.7)
if
¹ ¹1
(1 ¡ ~ ¼)K > 1 (2.8)
inequality (2.7) is violated and a contradiction to the hypothesis that Pr(st
1 =
s1jht¡1) > ~ ¼, any s1 6= s¤
1, is obtained. Taking the log of (2.8) and substituting
~ ¼ = 1¡ (1 ¡ ¹ ¼)=N the condition becomes
K >
log ¹ ¹1
log(1¡ (1 ¡ ¹ ¼)=N)
:
De¯ning K1 = [log¹¤
1=log(1¡(1¡ ¹ ¼)=N)]+1 provides the ¯rst part of the result.
17Finally, we want to ¯nd an upper bound on the number of times the stage
game is played and the probability that ¼¤
t < ¹ ¼ is less than a given ² > 0, when
the long run player plays s¤
1, i.e. we want to ¯nd the smallest integer K2(²) such
that
Pr(n(¼¤
t · ¹ ¼) > K1 ¢K2(²)jh¤) · ²: (2.9)
The probability on the left hand side of inequality (2.9) is less than or equal to
the probability that information revealing s2 are played less than K1 times when
the stage game is repeated K1 ¢ K2(²) times.
Suppose that the stage game is played K2(²) times; then the probability that
no information revealing s2 is played is
´ = (1¡ ¹ ¹2)K2(²) (2.10)
and 1¡ ´ is the probability that at least one information revealing s2 is played.
If the stage game is played K1 ¢ K2(²) times, i.e. if the experiment of playing
the stage game K2(²) times is repeated K1 times, the probability that at least K1
information revealing s2 are played is greater than (1¡´)K1. Therefore a su±cient
condition for the probability that less than K1 information revealing s2 are played
when the stage game is repeated K1¢ K2(²) times to be less than ² is
(1 ¡ ´)K1 ¸ 1¡ ²
whence
´ · 1¡ (1 ¡ ²)
1=K1: (2.11)
Substituting (2.10) in (2.11) and rearranging provides
K2(²) ¸




De¯ning K2(²) = [log(1 ¡ (1¡ ²)1=K1)=log(1 ¡ ¹¤
2)] + 1 concludes the proof. 2
18Remark 2: The lower bound on ¹2, ¹ ¹2, is to be interpreted as a lower bound on
the probability that information revealing s2 are played. In simultaneous move
stage games and in simultaneous move stage games in which the long run player
moves ¯rst all s2 are information revealing because the strategy of the long run
player is observed. For this class of game our result coincides with the one of
Fudenberg and Levine (1989).
We are now ready to state the main result. Let V
¹
1(±; ¹ ¹1; ¹ ¹2;!0
1) be the least
Nash equilibrium payo® to a long run player of type !0
1, with payo®s as in the
unperturbed game, when the discount factor is ±. Then
Theorem 1 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 be satis¯ed, and let 1¡~ ¹2 be the probability
that the short run player is the rational type. Then for all ² > 0, there exists a
K(¹ ¹1; ¹ ¹2;²) = K¤ otherwise independent of (-1;¹1) and (-2;¹2) such that
V
¹
1(±; ¹ ¹1; ¹ ¹2;!
0




1 +(1¡(1¡ ²)(1¡ ~ ¹2)±
K¤
)minu1: (2.12)
Proof: Suppose the long run player always plays the Stackelberg strategy. Since
the best response correspondence3 B(¾t
1) is upper hemi-continuous, each element
of B(¾t
1) is near to an element of B(s¤
1) when ¼¤
t is su±ciently near to one. Since
s2 is ¯nite, if ¾2 is near to an element of B(s¤
1), then it must place probability close
to one on s¤
2. Since the rational short run player has to be indi®erent between all
strategies that he is willing to assign positive probability, there is a probability
¹ ¼ < 1 such that B(st
1) µ B(s¤
1) whenever ¼¤
t > ¹ ¼.
Set K¤ = K¤(²) = K¤(²; ¹ ¹1; ¹ ¹2;¹ ¼) = K1 ¢ K2(²). If the long run player always
plays s¤
1, then from Lemma 2 it follows that the probability that there are more
3Recall that B(:) is the best response correspondence of the rational short run player.
19than K¤(²) occasions where the rational short run player plays outside of B(s¤
1)
(corresponding to the events ¼¤
t ¸ ¹ ¼) is less than ². In the worst case these events
occur at the beginning of the game where the payo®s are discounted the least.
Recalling that only a fraction 1 ¡ ~ ¹2 of short run players is rational provides the
right hand side of (2.12). Since the Stackelberg strategy is always feasible for the
long run player, the right hand side is a lower bound on any Nash equilibrium
payo®. 2
Remark 3: As said in Remark 2, in the case in which the stage game is simul-
taneous move or sequential move with the long run player moving ¯rst, ¹ ¹2 = 1
and the lower bound in Theorem 1 coincides with the lower bound in Theorem
1 in Fudenberg and Levine (1989). The same is true for sequential move stage
games in which the short run player moves ¯rst and in which the short run players
choose an information revealing s2 when ¼¤
t · ¹ ¼, such as the chain store game.
2.4 The Quality Game
In the following we want to discuss an important application of our results, the
quality game. The analysis will turn out to be simpler than in the previous section
given the simple structure of the game. In particular S1 has only 2 elements,
therefore N = 1 and 1 ¡ (1¡ ¹ ¼)=N = ¹ ¼.
Example 1. Consider the version of the quality game whose extensive form is
describedinFig. 2. When a = 1, b = ¡1, and c = 0, as arguedinthe introduction,
provided that ¹1(!¤
1) is not too high, the lower bound for the long run player Nash
equilibrium payo®s given by Theorem 2 in Fudenberg and Levine (1989) is just
minu1 = 0.
Now suppose that there are two types of short run player, the rational player,
20!0
2, with payo®s as given above, and a second one, !¤
2, with payo®s such that he
always buys. Suppose that these payo®s are a = 1, b = 1=2, and c = 0. The
rational player !0
2 on the other hand buys only if ¼¤
t ¸ ¹ ¼ = 1=2.
In this example we only have one long run player commitment type (!¤
1) and
one short run player commitment type (!¤
2). In the following we will therefore




2). Finally, notice that since
type !¤
2 always buys, we can disregard the term (1 ¡ ~ ¹2) in (2.12), since buying
is a best response to producing high quality.
Let ¹¤
1 = :1. Then K1 = [log ¹ ¹1=log¹ ¼] +1 = 4:








² (1¡ ²)¢ :99
K1¢K2(²) = :60 > 0
which is obtained maximizing with respect to ² the right hand side of inequality
(2.12) in Theorem 1. The ² that maximizes that expression turns out to be :11,
which implies that K2(²) = 10.
As claimed above, the introduction of uncertainty on the side of the short
run players improves substantially the lower bound on the long run player Nash
equilibrium payo®s. ²
The purpose of the next example is to assess the sharpness of the lower bound
on Nash equilibrium payo®s V
¹
1 that is computed using only ¹¤
1 and ¹¤
2. We will
show that, while the use of additional information relative to the distribution of
the short run player type does provide a better bound, the induced improvement
is far from dramatic.
Example 2. Suppose we introduce another type of short run player, !1
2, with
payo®s a = 1, b = ¡1=3, and c = 0, and whose prior is ¹(!1
2) = ¹1
2 = :2; short run
players of type !1
2 buy if ¼¤
t = 1=4, thus increasing the probability that the long
21run player's action be revealed. In this case, as suggested above, V
¹
1 turns out to
be larger.





2) and K00 = K¤(²;Pr(!¤
1jhK0);¹¤
2+¹1




2). To see this assume that at least one type !¤
2 short run player is selected when




t · ¼0 = 1=4. In this case K00 · K¤(²;¹¤
1=¼0;¹¤
2 + ¹1
2; ¹ ¼). Since in
computing K00 we have assumed that an event had happened whose probability is
1¡(1¡¹¤
2)K0
, the probability that ¼¤






















In the previous examples we have made the assumption that a type of short
run player exists with strictly positive probability that had s¤
2, an information
revealing strategy as a strictly dominant strategy, which implies that that type of
short run player will play s¤
2 regardless of the long run player he believes to face.
Anotherassumptionthat is perfectly consistent withthestructure ofthemodel
is the following:
Assumption 3 A type of short run player exists with strictly positive probability
that plays s¤
2 provided that the probability that the long run player is the Stackelberg
leader type is greater than or equal to ¹¤
1, the prior probability that he is of that
type.





1)b ¸ c; (2.13)
22whereas Assumption 2 was equivalent to
a ¸ c ; b ¸ c: (2.14)
As is clear Assumption 2 is stronger than Assumption 3 in that (2.14) implies
(2.13) but not 0: (2.13) might hold also when a ¸ c but b < c. In the context of
the quality game this means that the short run player commitment types do not
prefer purchase to no purchase independently of the quality; it just means that
given their preferences they are more willing to take the risk of buying than the
rational short run player.
Consider again the game of Fig. 2, and suppose that type !¤
2 has payo®s
a = 1, b = ¡1=9, c = 0. If we assume, as in Example 1, that ¹¤
1 = :1, we then
have ¹¤
1a + (1¡ ¹¤
1)b = :1 ¢ 1+ :9¢ (¡1=9) = c = 0, Assumption 3 is satis¯ed and
our results follow.
A major di®erence between Assumptions 2 and 3 however exists. Suppose
that in the game of Fig. 2 the payo® to the long run player when he produces
low quality is 4 rather than 3/2. If we make Assumption 2, and ¹¤
2 = :3 it turns
out that the Stackelberg leader strategy is to produce low quality, since in this
case his expected payo® is :3¢ 4 = 1:2. In other words if enough short run players
exist that always buy and the di®erence between the payo® to the long run player
when he produces low and high quality is large enough, it might be better for him
to exploit the short run commitment types rather than building a reputation for
honesty.
If we make Assumption 3, on the other hand, and we assume that b < c, the
same result does not hold: after the ¯rst time the long run player produces low
quality he is revealed to be the rational type (Pr(!¤
1) = 0) and no other short run
player is guaranteed to ever buy in the future, not even the commitment types.
While we think that the two assumptions we have been discussing can be
23appropriate for di®erent games, we also believe that Assumption 2 is interesting
in that it highlights that reputation does not always work.
In the examples we have presented so far we have chosen a discount factor
that is not too large: if the reference period is one month, ± = :99 translates to
a yearly interest rate of 12:8%. We have chosen to do so to stress the fact that
the result doesn't hold only for very patient long run players. However in many
economic examples the relevant reference period can be shorter: if the relevant
period is for example one week, a weekly discount factor ± = :999 would translate
to a yearly interest rate of 5:3%, and in this case V
¹
1 in Example 1 would be larger
than :93.
2.5 Discussion
Whenever the strategy of a player is not perfectly observed, that player might
be prevented from establishing a reputation for an appropriate behavior. This
chapter showed that by introducing types of short run players that are such that
all informational nodes of the stage games are reached with strictly positive prob-
ability in any equilibrium, a long run player can actually establish a reputation
for establishing any particular stage game pure strategy.
In a more general sense the point of this chapter was to show that the negative
result pointed at at the beginning of the section is not robust with respect to
perturbations of the information structure of the game.
An alternative more general framework is one in which it is assumed that the
action of the short run player is not perfectly observed4 and that the support of
the distribution over outcomes is invariant with respect to the action chosen by
the short run player.
4Suppose there is some noise or that the short run player trembles.
24This approach lends itself to more general applications and will be pursued
further in Chapter 3 to study reputational e®ects in in¯nitely repeated games








































































Figure 2.2: Quality Game with unspeci¯ed payo® for the short run player
26Chapter 3
Reputation in Repeated Games
with Two Long Run Players
273.1 Introduction
Since the work of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982), the
existence of even a small amount of uncertainty relative to the payo® function of
a player has been used to provide predictions of the outcome of repeated strategic
interaction between two or more players.
The seminal work of Fudenberg andLevine (1989) considers the case of an in¯-
nitely repeated game between a long run player (a player with a positive discount
factor who maximizes the present value of his in¯nitely repeated game payo®)
and an in¯nite sequence of short run players who observe all previous play of
the game (or, equivalently of a single player with zero discount factor who, in
each period, maximizes his current payo®). In this setting, Fudenberg and Levine
(1989) ¯nd that if there is strictly positive probability that the long run player is
a commitment type who always plays a particular action regardless of the previous
play, and if the long run player imitates this type, then there is a ¯nite number
of periods in which the opponent may not play a best response to such action.
As a consequence, the long run player can obtain the so called Stackelberg
payo® in all but a ¯nite number of repetitions of the stage game, which in turn
implies that, if he is su±ciently patient, in any equilibrium his average payo®
cannot be lower than a payo® which is arbitrarily close to the Stackelberg payo®.
Chapter 2 extends the results of Fudenberg and Levine (1989) to the case
in which a long run and a short run player play repeatedly a sequential game.
An interesting example of this class of game is the so called \Quality Game" in
which the short run player has to decide whether to buy a product or not, and
the long run player has to decide whether to produce a high quality or a low
quality product, but the quality of the product is observed and made public only
if purchase occurs. In this case the problem is that, if short run players believe
28that the product will be a low quality one, then there is an equilibrium in which
they will not to and the long run player has no way of establishing a reputation
for producing high quality.
In Chapter 2 a perturbation on the types of the short run players was intro-
duced that made sure that all informational nodes of the stage game be visited
with strictly positive probability, and it was shown that the probability that the
number of periods in which the short run player may believe that the long run
player is unlikely to play the Stackelberg strategy exceeds a given ¯nite number
becomes arbitrarily small as this ¯nite number increases.
Schmidt (1993) considers the case of arepeated game between two players who
both have nonzero discount factors, and mostly deals with the case in which there
is uncertainty only relative to player 1's payo® function, so that only player 1
can establish a reputation. His main contribution is that Fudenberg and Levine's
(1989) result can be extended to the case of two long run players provided that
the stage game belongs to the class of games with con°icting interest with respect
to player 1. This means that the strategy of player 1 that maximizes player 1's
payo® subject to the constraint that player 2 play a short run best response is
also the strategy that minmaxes player 2.
The mainprobleminthe caseof two patient players whoseactions areobserved
is that guaranteeing that player 1 is likely to play a certain action today does not
imply that player 2 will play a best response to it, since he also cares about future
payo®s. This implies that he might believe that the probability that player 1 will
keep playing a given action if he currently plays a best response to this action
is arbitrarily low, and in particular he might believe that if he does play a best
response today, he will get a low payo® in the continuation game. In such a case,
since player 2 would never play a best response to the action player 1 is trying
29to establish a reputation for, the probability that the continuation play will be
unfavorable to him, if he plays a best response, may well stay arbitrarily high
since player 1's behavior in this contingency is never observed.
Con¯ning attention to games with con°icting interest with respect to player
1, however, implies that if player 2 does not play a best response to player 1's
Stackelberg strategy he gets less than his minmax payo®, while playing a best
response today he wouldget his minmax payo® today andno less thanhis minmax
in any continuation game.
As is clear, the main problem with the case of two long run players and per-
fect action observability, is that in¯nite strategies may not be observed if some
informational nodes are never reached along the equilibrium path. The purpose
of this Chapter is to apply an argument similar to Chapter 2 to make sure that all
informational nodes are visited, so that the probability that player 1 is repeatedly
playing a history dependent strategy will stay bounded away from 1 witharbitrar-
ily small probability. This will be accomplished assuming that while the action
of player 1 is perfectly observed, the action of player 2 is not: players commonly
observe only a noisy outcome of the choice of the action of player 2, and there is
a su±cient amount of noise so as to guarantee that all ¯xed length ¯nite histories
occur with strictly positive probability.
Making this assumption will be shown to be su±cient to guarantee that player
1 can successfully establish a reputation for an appropriate strategy in all ¯nite
stage games with perfect observability of player 1's action and imperfect observ-
ability of player 2's action. It will also be argued that introducing this kind of
perturbation on the observed outcome of player 2's play, not only allows to gener-
alize Schmidt's (1993) result, but also that a tighter equilibrium characterization
is possible. In fact, when we consider the case of two long run player in games
30which do not have con°icting interest with respect to player 1, the strategy player
1 would most like to commit to is not necessarily a ¯xed action but can also be a
history dependent strategy.
This intuitioncanbeeasilyexplained consideringthe classical prisoner'sdilemma:
it has beenarguedthat player 1 might want to commit to tit-for-tat rather than to
the static Stackelberg strategy which gives only the static Nash equilibrium payo®
(which in this case is equal to the minmax payo®). If the value of the discount
factor of player 2 is su±ciently high, however, player 1 might want to commit to
a strategy in which he occasionally plays Cheat and which calls for a su±ciently
strong punishment for player 2 if he fails to play Cooperate.
As in the rest of the literature on reputation on repeated games, the goal of
this Chapter is to characterize the set of Bayesian Nash equilibrium by ¯nding a
lower bound on player 1's Bayesian Nash equilibrium payo®.
In the remainder of the Chapter the assumption will be made that types that
are committed to any ¯nitely repeating pure strategy1 exist with strictly positive
probability.
Under this assumption it will be shown that for a ¯xed discount factor of
player 2, the equilibrium payo® to an arbitrarily patient player 1 can be no less
than an amount which is arbitrarily close to the best payo® he could obtain by
committing to any strategy subject to the condition that player 2 will play the
best response to that strategy player 1 likes the least2.
The intuition that player 1 can take better advantage of his opportunity to
establish a reputation will be shown to be true, in the sense that, if player 2
1A strategy is ¯nitely repeated if there is an integer T, such that the strategy at time t is
only determined by the history of the last T rounds.
2The assumption that player 2 plays the best response player 1 likes the least is made since
in order to ¯nd a lower bound on Bayesian Nash equilibrium payo® it is not possible to assume
player 2's cooperation.
31is su±ciently patient, then a su±ciently patient player 1 will be able to get an
average payo® which cannot be substantially less than the highest payo® from a
correlated strategy that gives player 2 more thanhis pure strategy minmax payo®.
Fudenberg and Levine (1991) deal with the case of a long run player playing
against asequence ofshort run opponents a ¯xed stagegame with imperfect action
observability also for player 1, and analyze the result when the long run player
is allowed to establish a reputation for a mixed strategy as well. In the present
Chapter we will concentrate on the case in which the action of player 1 is perfectly
observed since the only assumption which is necessary for the result is that there
is a su±cient amount of noise in the observation of the action of player 2, and the
more general result could be obtained at the expense of heavier notation.
Allowing a player to establish a reputation for a mixed strategy, in general
increases the payo® he could thus obtain. Since in the case in which player 2 is
su±ciently patient asu±ciently patient player1 is guaranteed toobtainalmost the
highest expectedpayo®hecouldobtainwithacorrelated strategysubject toplayer
2 getting more than his pure strategy minmax payo®, however, the introduction
of mixed strategies gives a higher bound on player 1's Bayesian Nash equilibrium
payo® only if the minmax payo® for player 2 is strictly less than his pure strategy
minmax payo®.
The rest ofthe Chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces notation
and describes the in¯nitely repeated game. The general result is given in 3.3.
Section 3.4 provides the stronger equilibrium characterization of the case in which
player 2 is su±ciently patient. In Section 3.5 the relationship between the results
of the previous two Sections and existing literature (in particular Chapter 2 and
Schmidt (1993)) is discussed. Section 3.6 provides a discussion of the results as
well as directions of further research.
323.2 The Model
Consider a repeated game between two players, player 1 and player 2. Let A1 and
A2 denote the ¯nite (pure) action sets of the two players in the stage game with
generic elements a1 and a2, and let ®i 2 Ai denote respectively mixed actions and
mixed action spaces for player i = 1;2. Further let A = A1£A2, andA = A1£A2
denote the spaces of pure and mixed strategy pro¯les.
At the end of each period t = 1;2;::: the action chosen by player 1 is observed
by both players, while the action chosen by player 2 is not public knowledge:
players commonly observe only a stochastic outcome drawn from a ¯nite set,
y 2 Y . The probability distribution over outcomes depends on the action chosen
by player2 andisdenotedby ½(yja2) for apureactiona2; withanabuseofnotation
we will denote by ½(yj®2) the probability distribution over outcomes y 2 Y for a
given mixed action ®2 which is de¯ned in the obvious way from the probability
distribution for pure actions.
Player 1 can be one of countably many types ! 2 -. The types are drawn
from a common knowledge prior ¹ assigning positive probability to all points in
-. Player 1's type is private knowledge and is not known to player 2. In the
following we will focus on a particular type !0, which we refer to as the \rational
type".
Stage game payo®s are u1(a1;y) for type !0 player 1 and u2(a1;a2;y) for player
2. Player 1 has discount factor ±1 and player 2 has discount factor ±2; both player
2 and type !0 player 1 maximize the average discounted payo® in the in¯nitely
repeated game. It will also be assumed that both 1 and u2 are bounded below
from 0, and that u1 · ¹ u1 and u2 · ¹ u2.
Types of player 1 other than type !0 have preferences over probability distri-
butions over sequences of player 1 actions and public outcomes, but these are not
33necessarily representable in a time separable form.
We will denote by ht 2 Ht = (A1 £ Y)t¡1 the public history of the game up




2 the private history of player 2 up to time t.
H = H1 and H" = H2
1will denote in¯nite histories.
A type behavior strategy for player 1 is a mapping ¾1 : H1 ! A1
1 , ¾1 =
(¾11;:::;¾1t;:::) where ¾1t : Ht ! A1. A behavior strategy for player 2 is a
mapping ¾2 : H1£H2
1 ! A1
2 , ¾2 = (¾21;:::;¾2t;:::) where ¾2t : Ht£H2
t ! A2.
A behavior strategy for player 1 is a mapping ¾1 : - ! §1
1 , where §1
1 denotes
the set of (in¯nite) type behavior strategies.
ABayesian Nash equilibriumis abehavior strategy for player 1, anda behavior
strategy for player 2, together with a set of probability beliefs over the set of
types of player 1, such that: (i) for each type of player 1 given player 2's behavior
strategy, no other type behavior strategy yields a distribution over time sequences
of own actions and public outcomes that is preferred to the one obtained under
his type behavior strategy; (ii) for player 2 given player 1's behavior strategy
and the probability beliefs, no other behavior strategy yields a distribution over
time sequences of own actions and public outcomes that is preferred to the one
obtained under his behavior strategy; (iii) probability beliefs are updated using
Bayes's rule whenever applicable.
With an abuse of notation we will denote by u1(¾1t(ht¡1);¾2t(ht¡1;h2
t¡1)) the
expectedpayo® toplayer i = 1;2 if players 1 and 2are usingrespectively strategies
¾1 and ¾2 the public history of the game at time t is ht¡1 and the private history
of player 2 is h2
t¡1.
We will call a type behavior strategy for player 1 repeating if there exists an
integer T such that play at time t = T + 1;::: is entirely determined by the
history between t ¡ T and t ¡ 1. Notice that for any T < 1 there are countably
34many pure repeating strategies for player 1. A type of player 1 whose preferences
are such that playing the type behavior strategy ¾1 is strictly dominant is called
committed to that strategy, and we will denote the event that player 1 is such a
type by !(¾1).
3.3 Establishing a Reputation Against a Patient
Opponent
The purpose of this section is to study the general conditions under which repu-
tation for any particular behavior can be established by player 1 when player 2 is
patient. In the remainder of this section we will use the two following assumptions
Assumption 4 If ¾1 is pure repeating then ¹(!(¾1)) > 0.
Assumption 5 There exists a ° 2 (0;1) such that ½(yj®2) > °, for all ®2 2 A2
and all y 2 Y.
Assumption 4 guarantees the existence of \irrational" types to assure that the
rational player 1 can hope to build a reputation for punishing player 2.
Assumption 5 is the truly substantive assumption: it says that the support of
the distribution over outcomes does not depend on the action chosen by player 2.
If the support of the distribution over outcomes depended on the action chosen
by player 2 then it would be easy to construct counterexamples to the theorems
below. The crucial point is that if player 2's play excludes certain outcomes
y 2 Y, then player 2 will not learn how player 1 would have responded to those
contingencies, and this can easily prevent player 1 from building a reputation for
particular responses to those contingencies.
Before analyzing reputation in our model, we calculate as a benchmark how
much the long-run player might hope to get by precommitting.
35De¯nition 1 For all ±2 < 1, ¾2 2 B²(¾1;±2) if there is no other ~ ¾2 2 §1
2 such








2 u2(¾1; ~ ¾2):
We will say that ¾2 2 B(¾N
1 ;±2), ¾N
1 2 §N
1 , if ¾2 2 B²(¾1;±2), for all ¾1 2
§1
1 whose N-truncation coincides with ¾N
1 . Moreover, we will say that ¾N
2 2
B(¾N
1 ;±2), if ¾N
2 is the N-truncation of a ¾2 2 B²(¾N
1 ;±2).











and let ¹ U¤
1(±2) = ¹ U¤
1(0;±2)
¹ U¤
1(±2) denotes the maximal expected time average that player 1 can achieve by
committing to a pure strategy, when the discount factor of player 2 is ±2.
Our goal is to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumptions 4and 5 are satis¯ed. Thenlim±1!1N1(±1;±2) ¸
¹ U¤
1(±2).
We will prove this theorem via two Lemmas.
The purpose of the following Lemma is to show that there is a strategy such
that ifplayer 2playsan² best responsetoa N-truncationofit, andN is su±ciently
large, then if player 1 is su±ciently patient, the average discounted payo® he will
get in the N-fold repeated game is almost the average discounted payo® he would
get in the in¯nitely repeated game, if player 2 played an ² best response to his
strategy.




1N(ht+N)), and a ±11 < 1, such that forall ±1 > ±11 if¾N
2 2 B²(sN
1 ;±2),
the average discounted payo® to type !0 player 1 in the N-fold repeated game is
at least ¹ U¤
1(2²;±2)¡ ´.

























for all T ¸ ¹ T. Then choose N > ¹ T and ¿ such that ¹ u2±¿
2=(1 ¡ ±2) < ²=2 and
¹ u1¿=N < ´=2.
Let sN
1 be the N-truncation of a s1 satisfying (3.1)3. Now consider an N-fold
repetition of the stage game in which player 1 plays sN
1 . If player 2 plays an ²
best response to sN
1 , since ¿ is such that ¹ u2±¿
2=(1 ¡ ±2) < ²=2 , then in the ¯rst
N¡¿ periods of the N-fold repeated game he plays a 2² best response to s1. Since

































1 j < ´=4, the
Lemma follows. 2
The purpose of the next Lemma is to show that if player 1 always plays a
given strategy and there exists with strictly positive probability a type of player
1 that is committed to that strategy, then for every integer ¿, ¹ ¼ < 1, ² > 0, the
probability that the number of periods in which player 2 will expect player 1 to
3As is clear sN
1 is a pure repeating strategy.
37play like the commitment type in the following ¿ periods with probability less
than ¹ ¼ exceeds a given ¯nite number is less than ².
Let s¤
1 be the in¯nite repetition of strategy sN
1 constructed in the proof of
Lemma 3, and let H¤ be the set of histories consistent with player 1 playing s¤
1.
Let ¼¤¿
t = Pr(a1t0 = s¤
1t0(ht0¡1); for all ht0 2 H¤
t0; t0 = t;:::;t + ¿ ¡ 1) and let
n(¼¤¿
t · ¹ ¼) denote the random variable indicating the number of periods in which
¼¤¿
t · ¹ ¼ in the in¯nitely repeated game. Finally, let !¤ = !(s¤
1)) be a type that is
committed to s¤
1 and let ¹ !¤ denote the event that the type of player 1 is not !¤
(¹ !¤ = -n!¤. Since s¤
1 is pure repeating, !¤ 2 -, and therefore ¹¤ = ¹(!¤) > 0.
Lemma 4 Let 0 · ¹ ¼ < 1. Suppose that Assumption 2 is satis¯ed and that
(¾1t;¾2t) are such that Pr(h¤j!¤) = 1. Let K1 = ¿(log¹¤=log¹ ¼) and for all ² > 0
let K2(²) = log(1¡ (1¡ ²)1=K1)=log(1 ¡ °t). Then for all ² > 0
Pr(n(¼
¤¿
t · ¹ ¼) > K1K2(²)¿jh
¤) · ²:






Pr(!¤jht¡1)Pr(a1t;ytj!¤)+ (1¡ Pr(!¤jht¡1))Pr(a1t;ytj¹ !¤)
=
Pr(!¤jht¡1)Pr(a1tj!¤)






t = Pr(a1t = s¤
1t(ht¡1); a1t0 6= s¤
1t0(ht0¡1) for some ht0 2 H¤
t0; t0 = t +









t < ¹ ¼ for some t. This means that there is a history b hb t¡1, such
that Pr(a1b t¡1 = s¤
1b t(b hb t¡1) < ¹ ¼, b t = t + 1;:::;t + ¿ ¡ 1. Now suppose that this
history actually occurs4, and that Pr(!¤jb hb t¡1) = Pr(!¤jht), which means that
player 1's play until time b t¡ 1 led to no belief updating. From (3.2) we have
Pr(!¤jb hb t) =
Pr(!¤jb hb t¡1)
Pr(a1b t¡1 = ¾¤
1b t(b hb t¡1))
:
If player 1 plays a1b t¡1 = ¾¤
1b t(b hb t¡1), then the probability that he is type !¤ has to
go up by at least a factor of 1=¹ ¼, since Pr(a1b t¡1 = ¾¤
1b t(b hb t¡1)) < ¹ ¼. Given that
Pr(!¤jh0) = ¹¤, if history b hb t¡1 occurs, then Pr(!¤jh¿) ¸ ¹¤=¹ ¼. If a sequence of ¿
stage games is repeated K times, ¼¤¿
t < ¹ ¼ at the beginning of each sequence, and





However, since Pr(!¤jht) · 1, if ¹¤=¹ ¼K > 1 inequality (3.3) is violated and a
contradiction to the hypothesis that ¼¤¿
t < ¹ ¼ at the beginning of each of the K
repetitions of the ¿-fold repeated game is obtained. Taking the log of (3.3) we
obtain the de¯nition of K1.
Suppose now that the stage game is repeated K1K2(²)¿ times. We want to ¯nd
the smallest number K2(²) such that
Pr(n(¼
¤¿
t · ¹ ¼) > K1K2(²)¿jh
¤) · ²: (3.4)
is satis¯ed for a given ² > 0. Suppose that ¼¤¿
t < ¹ ¼, and let b hb t¡1 be such that
Pr(a1b t = s¤
1b t(b hb t¡1)) < ¹ ¼. Then by Assumption 5, a lower bound on the probability
that b hb t¡1 occurs is °¿. Therefore if the stage game is repeated K2(²)¿ times, the
probability that no appropriate history b hb t¡1 occurs is
Á = (1 ¡ °
¿)
K2(²) (3.5)
4Remember that by Assumption 5 all histories in H ¤ occur with strictly positive probability.
39and 1¡ Á is the probability that at least one appropriate history occurs.
If the stage game is repeated K1K2(²)¿ times, the probability that at least K1
appropriate histories occur is greater than (1 ¡ Á)K1. Therefore a su±cient con-
dition for the probability that less than K1 appropriate histories occur when the
stage game is repeated K1K2(²)¿ times to be less than ² is
1¡ (1 ¡ Á)K1 · ² (3.6)
from which
Á · 1¡ (1¡ ²)
1=K1 (3.7)
Substituting (3.5) into (3.7) and rearranging provides





which concludes the proof. 2
We are now in the position to prove Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumptions 4 and 5 are satis¯ed. Then
lim
±1!1
N1(±1;±2) ¸ ¹ U¤
1(±2):
Proof: From Lemma 3for all ´ > 0, ² > 0, there exists an N and apure repeating
strategy for player 1 sN
1 such that if player 2 plays an ² best response to it, there
exists a ±11 < 1 such that for all ±1 > ±11 the average discounted payo® to player
1 in the N-fold repeated game is at least ¹ U¤
1(2²;±2)¡´. Since the ² best response
correspondence of player 2, B²(¾1;±2), is upper hemi-continuous, there exists a
¹ ¼ < 1 such that if ¾N
1 is such that ¼¤N
t > ¹ ¼, then B²(¾N
1 ;±2) µ B2²(s¤N
1 ;±2).
40Let ¿ in Lemma 4 equal N. Then we know that for all ² > 0 and for all ¹ ¼ < 1 the
probability that the number of periods in which ¼¤N
t < ¹ ¼ is larger than K1K2(²)¿
is less than ².
Since K1K2(²)¿ is ¯nite for all ² > 0, for all ´ > 0 there exists a ±1 such that for
all ±1 > ±1 if player 1 always plays s¤
1 then his in¯nitely repeated game average
discounted payo® is at least ¹ U¤
1(²;±2) ¡ ´. Since strategy s¤
1 is always feasible for
the rational type in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the rational player 1 (type
!0) has to get at least what he would get by playing s¤
1 and the theorem follows.
2
3.4 The Value of Reputation with an Arbitrarily
Patient Opponent






In addition to the assumptions we made in the previous section, in this section
we will also need the following assumption
Assumption 6 There exists an a 2 A such that u2(a) > u2.
Assumption 6 says that there is a pro¯le that is better for player 2 than the pure
strategy minmax. This is a mild non-degeneracy condition. If it were to fail,
the indi®erence of the player 2 might well make him immune to threats by the
long-run player.
Let b ® 2 b A be a probability distribution on pure strategy pro¯les5. Then
de¯ne the set of enforceable pure action pro¯les E the set of correlated action
5This means that ® can also be a correlated strategy.
41pro¯les such that the payo® to player 2 is strictly larger than his minmax, u2:
E = fb ® 2 b Aju2(b ®) > u2g






Our goal is to show that when player 2 is su±ciently patient, an arbitrarily
patient player 1 can get the highest payo® subject to the constraint that player 2
is getting strictly more than his minmax level. In other words we want to prove
the following theorem:





N1(±1;±2) ¸ ¹ U
¤
1:
We will prove this theorem via several Lemmas.
Let aN = (aN
1 ;:::;aN













denote the average discounted payo® to player i = 1;2 in the N-fold repeated
game under action pro¯le aN.
Lemma 5 For all ´1 > 0 there exist N, aN = (aN
1 ;:::;aN
N) 2 AN, ±11 < 1
±21 < 1 such that for all ±1 > ±11, ±2 > ±21, b u1(aN;±1) > supb ®2Eu1(®) ¡ ´1 and
b u2(aN;±2) > u2:







42and u2(b ®¤) > u2. Again by continuity of u1 and u2 for all ´1=3 > 0 we can ¯nd






and b u2(aN;±2) > u2 and the proof is complete. 2















denote the average payo® to player 1 from playing aN in the N-fold repeated
game.
Now let aN¹ 2 AN¹ be the ¹-fold repetition of aN and let U1(aN¹) denote a
















2t ). The distribution of U1(aN¹) gives the distri-
bution of possible values of the average discounted payo® to player 1 when aN¹ is
being played in the N¹-fold repeated game.
Lemma 6 For every N, aN 2 AN, ´2 > 0 there exists a ±12 < 1 and a ¹ such
that for all ±1 > ±12
Pr(U1(a
N¹) < ~ u1(a
N)¡ ´2) < ´2:













2t). Then from the weak law of large numbers,
for all ´2=3 > 0 there exists a ¹ such that
Pr(~ U1(a








Since for all N¹ lim±1!1U1(aN¹) = ~ U1(aN¹), for all ´2=3 > 0 there exists a ±12 < 1
such that for all ±1 > ±12
jU1(aN¹)¡ ~ U1(aN¹)j <
´2
3
and the proof is complete. 2





(i) Pr(U1(aN¹) < ¹ U¤
1 ¡ ´1 ¡ ´2) < ´2 for all ±1 > ±
¤
1;
(ii) b u2(aN¹;±2) > u2 for all ±2 > ±
¤
2
Proof: Immediate from Lemmas 5 and 6.





a ±23 < 1, and an ² > 0 such that for all ±13 < ±2 < 1 there exists a ±13 < 1 such




1 ;±2), the average discounted payo® to type
!0 player 1 in the N3-fold repeated game is at least ¹ U¤
1 ¡ ´1 ¡ ´2 ¡ ´3.
Proof: We want to show that for all ´1;´2;´3 > 0 there exists a pure repeating
strategy for player 1 in the N3-fold repeated game, s
N3
1 , and a discount factor for





the loss in the N3-fold repeated game to a su±ciently patient type !0 player 1
with respect to ¹ U¤
1 is no more than ´1 + ´2 + ´3.
44Let vK
1 (ht) denote the average discounted payo® to player 1 in the last K









For ¯xed´1;´2 > 0, K ¸ 1, J ¸ 1de¯ne the random variable ¸t(ht¡1) asfollowing:
² For t = 1;:::;K, ¸t(ht¡1) = t, for all ht¡1 2 Ht¡1;
² For t = K + 1;K + 2;:::
¸t(ht¡1 =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
¸t¡1(ht¡2)+ 1 if ¸t¡1(ht¡2) · 0; for all ht¡1 2 Ht¡1
or if 0 < ¸t¡1(ht¡2) < K and vK
1 (ht¡1) ¸ ¹ U¤
1 ¡ ´1 ¡ ´2
1 if ¸t¡1(ht¡2) = K and vK
1 (ht¡1) ¸ ¹ U¤
1 ¡ ´1 ¡ ´2
¡J + 1 if ¸t¡1(ht¡2) > 0 and vK
1 (ht¡1) < ¹ U¤
1 ¡ ´1¡ ´2





2 < 1 such that for every ±1 > ±
¤
1
Pr(U1(aN¹) < ¹ U¤
1 ¡ ´1 ¡ ´2) < ´2
and for every ±2 > ±
¤
2, b u2(aN¹;±2) > u2. Let K = N¹ and let aK be an action







player 1's component of this action pro¯le.









1¸t(ht¡1) if ¸t(ht¡1) ¸ 1
a1 if ¸t(ht¡1) < 1
45Claim 1 Suppose that there exists a ±23 < 1 such that b u2(aN
1 ;±2) > u2 for ±23 <
±2 < 1, then for all ´4 > 0 there exist ¹, J, N3, ² > 0 such that if ~ ¾
N3
2 is such that
Pr(v
N¹(ht) < ¹ U
¤
1 ¡ ´1 ¡ ´2) > ´4
for some history ht that can be reached with strictly positive probability, for some






t (N¹;J) be the set of time t histories consistent with player 1 playing
s¤
1(N¹;J) for some ¹, J. Suppose strategy ¾
N3
2 is such that for some history
ht 2 H¤
t(N¹;J) that can be reached with strictly positive probability and such
that ¸t(ht¡1) ¸ 1
Pr(v
N¹
1 (ht¡1) < ¹ U
¤
1 ¡ ´1 ¡ ´2) > ´4:









2¸t(ht¡1)¹ if ¸t(ht¡1) ¸ 1
a2 if ¸t(ht¡1) < 1
Since player 2 can always play this strategy, for a strategy to be an ² best response
to s¤
1(N¹;J) it has to be the case that it gives more than the payo® of s¤
2(N¹;J)
minus ².










denote the highest discounted payo® player 2 can get if player 1 plays according



































































Some uninteresting algebra shows that the left hand side of inequality (3.10) gives
an upper bound on the in¯nitely repeated game payo® to player 2 if player 1
plays a strategy whose JN¹ truncation is s
¤JN¹
1 (N¹;J) while player 2 plays a
strategy such that there is a history ht 2 H¤




1 ¡ ´1 ¡´2) > ´4. Similarly the right hand side of (3.10) gives a lower bound on
the in¯nitely repeated game payo® to player 2 when players 1 and 2 play respec-
tively s
¤JN¹
1 (N¹;J) and s
¤JN¹
2 (N¹;J). Inequality (3.10) is therefore a necessary




1 ¡ ´1¡ ´2) > ´4 to be an ² best response to s
¤JN¹
1 .
Since by Lemma 6 for all N and aN 2 AN there exist ¹, ±12 < 1, ±22 < 1 such
that for all ±1 > ±12, ´2 > Pr(v
N¹
1 (ht) < ¹ U¤
1 ¡ ´1 ¡ ´2) is arbitrarily small and
for all ±2 > ±22 b u2(aN¹;±2) > 22, we can choose a ¹ so as to make the right hand
side arbitrarily close to b u2(aN;±2)(1¡ ±
JN¹
2 )=(1 ¡ ±2) ¡ ², which is in turn larger
than u2 ¡ ². This implies that there exists a ±23 < 1 such that there exists a J,
² > 0 for which the previous inequality is violated. Letting N3 > JN¹ the Claim
follows. ²
From the previous Claim we conclude that for all ´4 > 0 there exists a ±23 < 1
such that if player 2's discount factor is larger than ±23 and player 2 plays an ²




1 (ht) < ¹ U¤
1 ¡ ´1 ¡ ´2) < ´4, for all ht 2 H¤
t(N¹;J).
This implies that there exists a ±13 < 1 such that for all ±1 > ±13 the discounted
payo® to player 1 will be at least (¹ U¤
1 ¡ ´1 ¡ ´2)(1 ¡ ´4) in all but the last J
repetitions of the N¹-fold repeated game. De¯ning ´3 = ¹ U¤
1´4 and choosing N3
su±ciently large the Lemma follows. 2
47We are now in the position to prove Theorem 3.





N1(±1;±2) ¸ ¹ U¤
1:
Proof: From Lemma 7 for all ´1;´2;´3 > 0 there exists an N3 ±23 < 1 and a
pure repeating strategy for player 1 s
¤N3
1 such that for ±23 < ±2 < 1, if player 2
plays an ² best response to s
¤N3
1 , there exists a ±13 < 1 such that for all ±1 > ±13
the average discounted payo® to player 1 in the N3-fold repeated game is at least
¹ U¤
1 ¡ ´1¡ ´2 ¡ ´3. Since the ² best response correspondence of player 2 B²(¾1) is
upper hemi-continuous, for a ¯xed ±23 < ±2 < 1 there exists a ¹ ¼ < 1 such that if
¾
N3
1 is such that ¼
¤N3
t > ¹ pi, then B²(¾
N3
1 ;±2) µ B2²(s
¤N3
1 ;±2).
For all ´ > 0 let N3 be such that there exists an ² > 0 such that if player 2 plays a
2² best response to s
¤N3
1 , then there exists a ±14 such that for all ±1 > ±14 player 1
gets at least ¹ U¤
1 ¡´. Let ¿ in Lemma 4 equal N3. Then we know that for all ² > 0
and for all ¹ ¼ < 1 the probability that the number of periods in which ¼
¤N3
t < ¹ ¼ is
larger than K1K2(²)¿ is less than ².
Since K1K2(²)¿ is ¯nite for all ² > 0, for all ´ > 0 there exists a ±1 such that for
all ±1 > ±1 if player 1 always plays s¤
1 then his in¯nitely repeated game average
discounted payo® is at least ¹ U¤
1 ¡ ´. Since strategy s¤
1 is always feasible in any
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, player 1 has to get at least what he would get by
playing s¤
1 and the theorem follows. 2
Theorem 3 says that if player 2 is su±ciently patient, then an arbitrarily
patient player 1 will get an equilibrium average payo® which is at least what he
could get from any correlated strategy that gives player 2 strictly more than his
pure strategy minmax payo®, since for an arbitrarily patient player a sequence of
pure strategy pro¯les is equivalent to a correlated strategy.
48This implies that allowing player 1 to establish a reputation for mixed strate-
gies would give a higher bound on player 1's equilibrium payo® only if player 2's
minmax payo® is strictly lower than his pure strategy minmax payo®. Therefore,
in the cases in which minmax and pure strategy minmax payo® for player 2 co-
incide, the bound in Theorem 3 provides a tight characterization of equilibrium
payo®s.
3.5 Special Cases
The purpose of this section is to discuss the relationship of the general result of
Section 3.3 with the existing literature. Our goal will be to show that the results
of Chapter 2 and of Schmidt (1993) can be derived as special cases of this more
general model.
3.5.1 Reputation with a Short Run Opponent
As was discussed in the Introduction, Chapter 2 considers the case of a long run
player who can establish a reputation for a particular behavior against a sequence
of short run opponents who all observe the previous play of the game. The main
goal of Chapter 2 was to show that introducing a perturbation on the types of the
short run opponents that made sure that all informational nodes of a stage game
would occur with strictly positive probability, the long run player could establish
a reputation for playing the (short run) Stackelberg strategy, which in turn allows
to use reputational arguments to characterize the set of Nash equilibrium payo®s
by imposing a lower bound on the long run player's Nash equilibrium payo®.
Even though Chapter 2 was phrased in terms of perturbations on the types of
the short run opponents, the result is actually driven by the fact that all nodes
of the stage game are visited with strictly positive probability. In this sense,
49the result can be rephrased as giving a lower bound on the long run player's
payo® when Assumption 5 holds, i.e. when the play of the short run player is not
observed, and when the support of the probability distributions over outcomes do
not depend on the action chosen by the short run player.
When player 2's discount factor is equal to zero, the ² best response corre-
spondence B²(¾1;±2) coincides with the short run ² best response correspondence,
which implies that ¹ U¤
1 is equal to the static Stackelberg payo® and Lemma 3 be-
comes trivial since it states that if player 1 plays the Stackelberg strategy and
player 2 plays a short run best response to it, then player 1's payo® cannot be
lower than the Stackelberg payo®.
If player 2 has zero discount factor, he will not care about the future, and
therefore all that we need to show is that the probability that the number of
periods in which player 2 expects player 1 to play at the current stage only the
Stackelberg action with probability less than an arbitrary ¹ ¼ < 1 exceeds a given
number, becomes arbitrarily small as the given number increases.
In other words, given that the number of periods each short run player is
interested in is only 1, we need to state Lemma 4 for ¿ = 1. It is immediate to
see that the statement of Lemma 4 in Section 3.3 is equivalent to Lemma 2 in
Chapter 2, since when ¿ = 1 the de¯nitions of K1 and K2(²) are the same and
therefore so are K1K2(²)¿ in Section 3.3 and K1K2(²) in Chapter 2.
3.5.2 Games of Con°icting Interest
Schmidt (1991) studied reputational arguments in the characterization of equilib-
rium when player 2 is a patient player and the stage game is a game of con°icting
interest. A game of con°icting interest with respect to player 1, was de¯ned as
a game in which the (short run) Stackelberg action of player 1 is also an action
50that minmaxes player 2.
Schmidt's (1993) argument is that if player 2 is a patient player, then the fact
that he becomes convinced that player 1 will play the Stackelberg action at the
current stage does not imply that he will play a short run best response to it,
since he might believe that in the continuation of the game he will be minmaxed
if he does play a short run best response to it. In other words, player 2 might
never play a best response to the Stackelberg strategy and his estimate of the
probability of being minmaxed if he does play a best response can stay bounded
away from zero.
This argument was then shown to fail in games of con°icting interest with
respect to player 1, since never playing a best response to the Stackelberg strategy
gives player 2 a payo® which is lower than the minmax payo®.
As in the previous subsection, assuming that the stage game has con°icting
interest with respect to player 1, implies that ¹ U¤
1(±2) is equal to the (short run)
Stackelberg payo®, so that the limit result of Section 3.3 coincides with the limit
of Schmidt's (1993) result as ±1 ! 1.
Finally, if player 2 is su±ciently patient, Theorem 3 provides a stronger result
than the one in Schmidt (1993) since the result holds in a wider class of games
than the games of con°icting interest with respect to player 16, and, in particular,
given that ¹ U¤
1 is greater than or equal to the static Stackelberg payo®.
3.6 Conclusion
Ina repeatedgamebetweentwo patient players aplayer whosetype is notcommon
knowledge has been shown to be able to exploit the possibility of establishing
a reputation for a (possibly) history dependent pure strategy if a type that is
6Apart from the perturbation on the outcome, games of con°icting interest are a strict subset
of games satisfying Assumption 6.
51committed to such strategy exists with strictly positive probability, and if there
is even a small amount of noise in the observation of the other player that is such
that all ¯nite length histories can occur with strictly positive probability.
The results presented in this Chapter show that the implications of reputa-
tional arguments change dramatically when the actions of the player whose type
is common knowledge are only imperfectly observed. In fact the introduction of a
small amount of imperfect observability has been shown to be su±cient to extend
previous results for games with two long run players (Schmidt, 1993) to a wider
class of games, as well as to explicitly provide an even tighter characterization
of Bayesian Nash equilibrium for an arbitrarily patient player playing against a
su±ciently patient opponent.
Interesting applications of the results presented include the case in which ac-
tions are observed but players tremble, as well as a repeated principal agent prob-
lem in which the principal (player 1) cannot observe the action (e®ort) chosen by
the agent (player 2). In the latter case, the possibility for the principal of estab-
lishing a reputation for making payments which are made contingent not only on
the observed value of output, but also on the past history of the game, leads to
the conclusion that if both the principal and the agent are su±ciently patient,
then the principal will be able to get an average payo® which is equal to the net
value of the output under the e±cient e®ort level.
The framework presented here can be straightforwardly generalized to deal
with the case in which also player 1's action is imperfectly observed, using the
result on statistical inference introduced for this case by Fudenberg and Levine
(1991). More importantly, the framework of Fudenberg and Levine (1991) can be
used to introduce the possibility of establishing a reputation for a mixed strategy
since this can increase player 1's Bayesian Nash equilibrium payo® lower bound
52if player 1 can more successfully punish player 2 by using a mixed strategy than
by using a pure strategy. In such cases, if the two players are su±ciently patient,
introducing the possibility of establishing a reputation for a mixed strategy would
actually provide a tight bound on player 1's equilibrium payo®s.
53Chapter 4
Reputation in Dynamic Games
544.1 Introduction
Many economic problems have the feature that a state variable such as capital,
debt or money, provides a link between present actions and future payo® oppor-
tunities. As an example, games that describe the strategic interaction between a
government and households usually involve state variables. It is in this context
that the problem of time consistency of optimal government policy arises: since
ex-ante and ex-post optimal policies di®er, even a benevolent government may
not be able to achieve the optimal commitment outcome.
Recent work has turnedattention tothis kind ofgames. Dutta (1991) provides
a Folk theorem for stochastic games. Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Stokey (1992)
study the time inconsistency problem introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1977,
1980) and Fischer (1980) and characterize the set of equilibria in problems of
optimal policy design when the government cannot commit. Both Chari and
Kehoe (1990) and Stokey (1992) show that, if there is su±ciently littlediscounting,
a desirable outcome (the Ramsey outcome in a capital taxation model, Ramsey
(1927)), can arise in equilibrium. However, in their model the Ramsey outcome
is only one of many equilibria.1
We consider a general class of dynamic games withone large player and a large
number of small players. A deterministic transition law describes the evolution
of the state variable. The large player has some private information about his
type, i.e. the small players are uncertain about the type of large player they are
facing. This uncertainty may be very small in the sense that the large player is
of one particular type with a probability close to one. The goal of this Chapter is
to ¯nd conditions under which a patient large player can exploit the uncertainty
1It is sometimes argued that in this case the government may be able to select its pre-
ferred equilibrium. However, Dekel and Farell (1990) show that these selection arguments are
inconsistent.
55of his opponents and enforce an outcome that is essentially equivalent to publicly
committing to an optimal strategy.
The introduction of uncertainty relative to the type of a player and the conse-
quentpossibility ofacquiring areputationfor an appropriatebehavior has received
considerable attention in the literature. Starting with the work of Kreps and Wil-
son (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) the studies of reputation e®ects have
focused exclusively on repeated games.
Fudenberg and Levine (1989) study a class of repeated games in which a long
lived player faces a sequence of short lived opponents, each of whom plays only
once but observes the entire history of the game. If there is a positive probability
that the long lived player is a type who always plays the strategy to which the
normal player would like to commit, then reputation e®ects lead to a sharp pre-
diction for all Nash equilibria of the game: the large player will receive a payo®
that is at least as large as what he would receive if he could publicly commit to
his preferred strategy.
This result is robust in the sense that it does not rely on a re¯nement of Nash
equilibrium and that it is una®ected by further perturbations of the information
structure of the game, i.e. by the introduction of additional commitment types2.
The present Chapter uses reputational arguments and provides conditions un-
der which results analogous to the ones obtained by Fudenberg and Levine (1989)
apply to dynamic games and also provides conditions under which reputational
arguments may fail.
Since we consider games with a a large number (continuum) of small players,
we will assume that the individual play of the small players is not observed. In a
purely repeated game this assumption would imply that eachsmall player behaves
2For extensions of Fudenberg and Levine (1989) see Fudenberg and Levine (1992), Schmidt
(1993) and Cripps and Thomas (1992).
56like a short-lived player, since his actions will a®ect neither his future payo®s nor
the public history of the game. In a dynamic game the presence of state variables
creates an intertemporal link and introduces a new strategic dimension to the
problem. Even though a small player cannot in°uence his opponent's future play,
he can change the value of his individual state variable, thereby a®ecting his own
future payo® opportunities. Therefore a small player's behavior will depend on
the (expected) future actions of the large player 3.
For example, in a capital taxation model in order to choose a high investment
level today, the households in the economy need to become convinced that the
government will set low capital tax rates not only today but also in the future.
As is clear, the presence of state variables makes it more di±cult for the large
player to establish a reputation: small players have to become convinced that the
large player will follow a particular strategy not only in the current period but
also in the future. The more the small players' behavior is a®ected by play in the
distant future the harder it will be for the large player to gain from establishing
a reputation.
Our ¯rst result (Theorem 4) applies to the case where the small players have
a ¯xed discount factor while the large player is arbitrarily patient. If there is a
commitment type that plays the strategy to which the large player would want to
commit then in any Nash equilibrium the large player is guaranteed at least the
optimal commitment payo®4.
To obtain a result that holds for a wide range of interesting economic appli-
cations we allow the payo®s to the small players to depend on the aggregate play
of the small players and the aggregate state variable, as well as on their own play
3See also Schmidt (1993), for a similar e®ect in games with two long run players.
4By the optimal commitment payo®, we mean the maximal time average that the large player
could guarantee himself by publicly precommitting if the game started in the worst possible state
from the large player's point of view.
57and the play of the large player. In the terminology to be introduced, we allow
for strategic externalities among small players. This has the surprising implica-
tion that, for a ¯xed discount factor, arbitrarily distant play of the large player
may a®ect current behavior of the small players (see Example 2). If the optimal
commitment strategy can be approximated by an eventually periodic sequence,
i.e. a sequence that converges to some cycle of bounded length in ¯nitely many
periods, then also in this case reputation e®ects allow a precise characterization
of equilibria. Assuming that the discount factor of the small players stays ¯xed
while the large player gets arbitrarily patient, the large player will receive at least
the optimal commitment payo® in all Nash equilibria (Theorem 5).
Finally, we consider the case where both the large and the small players are
arbitrarily patient. This case is particularly relevant for policy games, in which,
for example, the payo® function of the government is equal to the payo® function
of the median voter. Then, if players are very patient, the small players' action
may be a®ected by very distant future outcomes.
In this case it is shown (Theorem 6) that the large player will only be able
to exploit his reputation if the following reversibility condition on the transition
function is satis¯ed. A transition function is reversible if players can move from
one state to another only if they can also return. This condition is satis¯ed in
capital accumulation games, but is not satis¯ed, for example, in the standard
durable goods monopoly 5. Once a customer has purchased the durable good,
he has reached an irreversible state. Example 3 shows how in the durable goods
monopoly reputational arguments fail to guarantee the large player his optimal
commitment payo®.
5See for example Coase (1972), Ausubel and Deneckere (1989), Stokey (1981), Fudenberg,
Levine and Tirole (1985), Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986).
58An interesting application of the case in which large and small players have
the same discount factor is the classical time inconsistency problem in an in-
tertemporal capital taxation model (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). Fischer (1980)
describes a situation in which a benevolent government has to ¯nance a public
good by levying taxes on capital and labor. If the government could commit to
a certain strategy, it could achieve the Ramsey outcome (Ramsey, 1927), i.e. the
sequence of combinations of capital and labor tax rates that minimize distortions.
Once capital has been accumulated, however, it is optimal for the government
to raise as much revenue as possible from capital taxation that is ex-post non
distortionary. If private investors expect the government to renege on its promise
to set low capital tax rates, they will accumulate a suboptimal level of capital.
The result of the present Chapter is that if the prior probability of a particular
commitment typeisstrictly positive, theninany Nashequilibrium the government
will achieve a payo® close to the payo® corresponding to credible commitment to
an optimal tax rate.
The structure of the Chapter is as follows. In section 4.2 we describe the
complete information game. Section 4.3 introduces the perturbed game, i.e. the
possibility of the large player to be one of many \types". Section 4.4 provides the
¯rst result for the case where the discount factor of the small players stays ¯xed
while the large player is very patient. Section 4.5 gives the result for the case
in which there are strategic externalities. Section 4.6 deals with the case where
large and small players share a common discount factor and Section 4.7 provides
conclusions. Proofs are presented in Section 4.8.
594.2 Description of the Game
The class of games we consider has two types of players: one large player denoted
by b, and a continuum of identical small players i 2 [0;1] = I. The ¯nite sets Y
and X denote the actions of the large player and the small players respectively;
y 2 Y , x 2 X. Furthermore we let § denote the set of mixed actions of the large
player.
Each small player has an individual state variable, z 2 Z, where Z is the state
space that is assumed to be ¯nite and identical for all small players. Let ¤ denote
the set of probability measure on Z, ¸ 2 ¤, and M denote the set of probability
measures on Z £ X, ¹ 2 M; ¹(z;x) is to be interpreted as the measure of small
players with initial value of the state variable equal to z that choose action x.
Finally let ¹Z 2 ¤ denote the marginal of ¹ on Z and ¹X the marginal of ¹ on X
(¹X belongs to the set of probability measures on X).
The game is played in the following way: At the beginning of each period
t = 1;2;::: the public history (to be described below) is observed by all players
and each small player observes his own private history. Conditional on these
observations, every small player takes an action xi 2 X and the large player
simultaneously takes a (possibly mixed) action ¾ 2 §, where § denotes the set of
probability distributions on Y .
After these actions have beenselected, payo®s occur andall players observe the
realization of the action of the large player yt and the distribution ¹t of actions of
the small players. Note that this is a joint distribution over actions and states, i.e.
after each period every player knows which proportion of players in state z played
action x, for every z 2 Z. Clearly this joint distribution has to be consistent with
the state in the beginning of the period ¸t 2 ¤, i.e. ¹Z
t = ¸t.
The law of motion for the individual state is described by the following func-
60tion:




t). In other words we assume that the value of the individual
state variable at date t+ 1 does not depend on the aggregate distribution of the
state variable or on the aggregate action played by the small players.
The aggregate law of motion is described by:







Note that F is continuous.
Let the distance between ¹t and ¹0














A public history of the game at time t is the sequence of realizations of yt0;t0 =
1;:::;t ¡ 1, ¹t0;t0 = 1;:::;t ¡ 1 and the aggregate state in period t, ¸t. Since
we will want to use a recursive de¯nition of histories we also include ¸¿ ¿ =
1;:::;t¡1 in the history at time t6. The set of histories in period t is denoted by
Ht = (Y £ M £ ¤)t¡1 £ ¤, with ht 2 Ht; h1 = ¸1 and ht = (ht¡1;yt¡1;¹t¡1;¸t)
for t > 1; H = H1. For the history from t0 to t, t0 · t we write htnht0 2 Ht¡t0.
For a given sequence of play (y;¹) = ((y1;y2;:::);(¹1;¹2;:::)) the payo® to
the large player is:
V






6Notice that given the transition law ¸t is determined by ¹1;y1;:::;¹t¡1;yt¡1.
61Similarly for a given sequence (y;¹;x;z) = ((yt;¹t;xt;zt)1
t=1) the payo® to a small
player is:





Since the small players' payo®s depend on the individual state variable this for-
mulation includes the case in which there is a ¯nite number of di®erent types of
small players.
Assumption 7 vb and v are continuous on M. Moreover 0 · v;vb · ¹ v.
A pure strategy for the large player is a mapping yt : Ht ! Y; a mixed
(behavioral) strategy is a mapping ¾t : Ht ! §. Similarly a strategy for a small
player is a mapping7 xt : Ht£Z ! X. An aggregate strategy for the small players
is a mapping ¹t : Ht ! M that satis¯es the following consistency requirement:
For ht = (ht¡1;¹t¡1;yt¡1;¸t), we have [¹t(ht)]Z = ¸t. In other words, for every
history the marginal distribution of ¹t(ht) over states has to coincide with the
current state ¸t. Finally, ¾ = (¾1;:::;¾t;:::), x = (x1;:::;xt;:::), and ¹ =
(¹1;:::;¹t;:::).
In an abuse of notation we will often write V (±;¾;¹;x;ht;zt) as the expected
payo® to a small player from playing x, starting at state zt after history ht.
Similarly V b(¯;¾;¹;ht) is the expected payo® to the large player after history ht.
4.2.1 Best Response and Aggregate Best Response
For a given strategy of the large player and a given aggregate strategy for the
small players (which no individual small player can in°uence) we de¯ne an ² best
response as follows:
7Given that private histories are unobservable, we assume that small players do not condition
their play on their private history.
62De¯nition 3 (² Best Responses) The strategy x = (xt)1
t=1, is an ² best re-
sponse for player i to (¾;¹) if for all ht 2 Ht;t = 1;:::, such that ht is a
public history that is reached with strictly positive probability and for all z 2 Z,
V (±;¾;¹;x;ht;z) ¸ V(±;¾;¹;x0;ht;z) ¡ ², for all x0. Let B²(¾;¹;¸;z) denote
the set of best responses given ¾, ¹, and initial state ¸, z.
Let B²
t(¾;¹;ht;z) be the ² best response in period t only, i.e. :
B
²
t(¾;¹;ht;z) = fx 2 X j x(ht;z) = x; for some x 2 B
²(¾;¹;z)g
Note that for ² = 0 we have the conventional best response.
De¯nition 4 (Aggregate ² Best Response) The aggregate strategy ¹ = (¹t)1
t=1,
is an aggregate ² best response to ¾ for initial state ¸, if for all ht that are reached
with strictly positive probability there is a ¹ with j¹ ¡ ¹t(ht)j < ² such that x 2
B²
t(¹;¾;ht;z), for all (x;z) 2 supp¹. Let E²(¾;¸) denote the set of aggregate ²
best responses to ¾ for initial state ¸.
Therefore an aggregate ² best response to a strategy ¾ of the large player is an
aggregate strategy ¹ such that almost all individual strategies in its support are
an ² best response to ¹ and ¾ for all reached histories.
Finally let E²
t(¾;ht) be de¯ned as the aggregate ² best response in period t
only, given a history ht:
E
²
t(¾;ht) = f¹ 2 Mj¹(ht) = ¹ for some ¹ 2 E
²(¾)g
When t = 1, h1 = f¸g, therefore we will write E²
1(¾;¸) instead of E²
1(¾;h1).
For ² = 0 we get the usual best response and aggregate best response. Let
B;Bt;E;Et; denote the best response and aggregate best response for ² = 0.
Note that according to De¯nition 2, all small players may be able to gain ²
every period if an aggregate ² best response is played. Thus for an aggregate ²
63best response to be close to an aggregate best response ² has to be small relative
to the discount factor ± since ²=(1 ¡ ±) measures the maximum utility loss for a
typical small player over the course of the game. While for a ¯xed discount factor
an ² can be chosensuch that ²=(1¡±) is very small, when we will consider the case
where the discount factor of the small players is arbitrarily close to one (Section
4.6), we will need to use a stronger notion of aggregate ² best response.
4.3 The Perturbed Game
Now we consider a slight variation of the game de¯ned above. Suppose that the
small players are not completely sure about the large player's payo® function and
in particular that they believe that with positive probability the large player's
payo® function is di®erent from the one described in the previous section. Let -
be the space of potential types with generic element !. Then the large player's
payo® function will also depend on his type, V b(¯;y;¹;!;ht). Let !0 denote the
event that the type of the large layer is such that his payo® function is like in the
unperturbed game, i.e. V b(¯;y;¹;!0;ht) = V b(¯;y;¹;ht). In the following we
will call type !0 the rational or normal player.
Types other than !0 may have a possibly history dependent payo® function
that makes a given pure strategy dominant in the in¯nite game. Such players will
be called commitment players and for the sake of simplicity will be identi¯ed by
the strategy they play rather than by their payo® function.
The existence of these commitment types captures uncertainty of the small
players about the type of large player they are facing. The idea is that although
the small players are almost certain they face the rational type, they cannot
exclude the possibility that the large player perceives the game in a di®erent way
and hence will behave \irrationally". To account for the possibility that the large
64player can be of di®erent types we have to modify the de¯nition of a strategy
for the large player. A mixed (behavioral) strategy for the large player is now a
mapping ¾t : Ht £ - ! §.
Since the small players cannot observe the type of the large players, the de-
¯nition of a strategy for the small players remains unchanged. We assume that
the prior distribution of types is common knowledge. By ¾n¾0(!) we denote the
strategy that is obtained by substituting ¾0(!) for ¾(!) in ¾.
De¯nition 5 A Nash equilibrium for initial state ¸ is a (¾;¹) with ¹Z
1 = ¸, such
that ¹ 2 E(¾;¸), and for all ! 2 -, V b(¯;¾;¹;!;¸) ¸ V b(¯;¾n¾0(!);¹;!;¸)
for all ¾0(!).
First we want to investigate the consequences of imitating a particular com-
mitment type on the beliefs of the small players. In Lemma 8 we show that if
the large player chooses to imitate a pure strategy of a particular commitment
type, then in all but ¯nitely many periods the small players will actually believe
that with high probability the aggregate play will be consistent with this strategy
being played in the next ¿ periods. Both the formulation and the proof of Lemma
8 are an extension of a result in Fudenberg and Levine (1989).
Let y¤ denote the pure strategy played by a particular commitment type !¤.
Let h¤ be the event that yt = y¤
t(ht) for all ht that are reached following (y¤;¹)
starting from a given h0 = ¸0. Furthermore let p(!¤) = p¤ denote the prior
probability that ! = !¤. Let ¼¤¿
t be the probability that in the next ¿ peri-
ods the actions of the large player are consistent with y¤, i.e. the probability
that in periods t;t+ 1;:::;t+ ¿ ¡ 1 aggregate play is consistent with y¤ being
played given the aggregate strategy ¹, i.e. ¼¤¿
t = Pr[yt = y¤
t(ht);:::;yt+¿¡1 =
y¤
t+¿¡1(ht+¿¡1)jht¡1;¹]. Finally, let n(¼¤¿
t · ¹ ¼) be the random variable denoting
the number of periods in which ¼¤¿
t · ¹ ¼.
65Lemma 8 Let 0 < ¹ ¼ < 1 and suppose that p¤ > 0, and that (¾;¹) are such that












Remark: Note that since certain states may not be reached along a given history
h¤, the small players will not get convinced that the large player actually uses the
same strategy as the commitment type. However, since no individual small player
can a®ect the aggregate state, the play in public histories that are not reached is
irrelevant for any small player's decision problem.
4.4 The Case with No Strategic Externality
In this section we consider the simpler case in which the payo® of every small
player is independent of the aggregate play of the small players.
Assumption 8 (No Strategic Externality) v is independent of ¹.
The following equation de¯nes ¹ V b to be the limit of time averages of the large











where (yt;¹t) is the history induced by y and ¹ and ¸.
De¯ne a strategy y such that yt(ht) = yt for all ht a simple strategy. A simple
strategy is a strategy that does not depend on history but only on calendar time.
With an abuse of notation in the following we will sometime identify a simple
strategy with the in¯nite sequence of actions it prescribes, y = y.
66Let ¹ V b(²;¸)be thebest time average thelargeplayercouldguarantee tohimself
by committing to a given simple strategy subject to the small players playing an







Let ¹ V b(²) = inf¸ ¹ V b(²;¸) and let ¹ V b = lim²!0 ¹ V b(²).
Now we de¯ne a collection of types (the Stackelberg types) which can be
used by the rational large player to establish a reputation. Let y(²;´;¸) =




b(y(²;´;¸);¹;¸) ¸ ¹ V
b(²;¸)¡ ´:
Hence y(²;´;¸) is an \almost" optimal sequence if the criterion is the limit of time
averages.
The type !(²;´;T) is de¯ned by the following strategy:
² In the ¯rst T periods this type follows y(²;´;¸1).
² In case the small players reacted with an ² best response in period 1, this
type continues with y(²;´;¸1) in period T + 1. If the small players did not
choose an action close to a best response in period 1, this commitment type
switches to y(²;´;¸T+1).
² The same pattern is repeated for all periods: The commitment type will
continue following the sequence y(²;´;¸) if either it has been played for
fewer than T periods or if T periods ago \almost" a best response was
played. Otherwise a new sequence y(²;´;¸0) will be started, where ¸0 is the
current value of the state variable.





1 if t = 1
µt¡1 + 1 if µt¡1 < T or if ¹t¡T 2 E²
t¡T(y(²;´;¸t¡µt¡1);h¿¡T)
1 otherwise
Now let the type !(´;²;T) be de¯ned by following strategy:
yt(ht) = yµt(²;´;¸t¡µt)
Note that the T-period lag in adjusting the optimal policy in the de¯nition
of the commitment types is crucial to avoid the time-inconsistency problem. A
commitment type who chooses the optimal policy for the current state in every
period is of little use to the large player since he wants tocommit toex-ante rather
than ex-post optimal policies.
Assumption 9 For all (²;´) there is an ²0 < ²;´0 < ´ such that !(²0;´0;T) 2 -
has strictly positive prior probability for all ¯nite T.
Assumption 9 says that there is a large variety of the described Stackelberg types.
In particular, for arbitrarily small (²;´) we can ¯nd a commitment type with
positive prior for any ¯nite \lag parameter" T.
In Theorem 4 we make two important assumptions that will be relaxed later.
First we assume that v is independent of ¹, i.e. there is no \strategic externality"
inthe play ofthe small players. Second we assume that the small players' discount
factor stays ¯xed while the large player's discount factor approaches 1. Theorem 4
states that if the type space includes a particular collection of commitment types
then as the discount factor of the large player goes to 1 in any Nash equilibrium
he gets at least ¹ V b.
Theorem 4 Suppose that Assumptions 7, 8 and 9 hold. Then in any Nash equi-
librium (¾;¹) for initial state ¸, lim¯!1V b(¯;¾;¹;¸) ¸ ¹ V b.
68The intuition behind Theorem 4 is the following: Suppose that the large player
imitates a commitment type !(²;´;T). Then Lemma 8 implies that after a ¯nite
number of periods the small players will actually believe that the large player
will continue to play like the commitment type in the next ^ T periods with very
high probability. Since the small players discount future payo®s there is a ^ T large
enough such that if the commitment strategy is followed with large probability in
the next ^ T periods then the small players will actually play a best response to the
commitment strategy. Since we can ¯nd commitment types with positive prior
probability for arbitrarily large lag parameter T, we can choose T in such a way
that T > ^ T. In this case an aggregate ² best response to the commitment strategy
implies anaggregatebest response to anoptimal sequence y(²;´;¸). The Theorem
then follows from the fact that this argument can be repeated for arbitrarily small
(²;´).
4.5 Including Strategic Externalities
In many economic problems the utility of individuals depends on their individual
choice as well as on the aggregate behavior of the other individuals, for example
through prices in a market game or through the aggregate level of capital in
a capital accumulation problem with externalities. In this section we discuss
reputational arguments in the general case in which the payo®s to individual
small players may also depend on the aggregate play of the small players.
Allowing for this possibility complicates the analysis for the following reason:
Even though small players discount future payo®s at a ¯xed rate ± < 1, it is not
true that the aggregate ² best response today does not change when the large
player's action in the very distant future changes.
The largeplayer can only exploit his reputation successfully if the small players
69choose an aggregate ² best response to the commitment strategy whenever the
large player imitates this strategy long enough. This implies that we need to ¯nd
a (uniform) bound T such that if the small players believe that the commitment
strategy is playedfor the next T periods, then they will actually play anaggregate
² best response to it. When v is independent of ¹ discounting implies that we can
¯nd such a T uniformly over all strategies. If v depends on ¹, this property fails.
The following example illustrates this point.
Example 2 Consider an economy in which there is a continuum of private agents
(small players) and a government (large player). Suppose that private agents can
choose between becoming specialized or staying autarkic. Then the strategy space
for each private agent is X = f0;1g where x = 0 symbolizes autarky and x = 1
specialization. Any agent can either be in an experienced state, z = 1, or in an
inexperienced state, z = 0. Experience is obtained after having specialized for one
period. If an experienced agent fails to specialize, then he loses his experience.
Hence the individual state variable transition can be summarized by: f(x;z) = x,
x = 0;1.
Only experienced agents who specialize are productive. However, their payo®
from specialization depends on how many other agents decide to specialize in the
current period (irrespective of whether these agents are experienced or not). Let
¹X(1) be the fraction ofagents who specialize in thecurrent period, then the value
of the output produced by an agent who plays x and is in state z is: ¹X(1)zx¡cx
where c is the cost of specialization.
The government has two policies: It can either do nothing (y = 0) or it can
reward all the experienced specializing agents by giving them a subsidy of 1 for
each unit they produce (y = 1). With this set-up the payo® function of a private
70agent will be
v(¹;y;x;z) = (¹
X(1) +y)zx ¡ cx:
The government is benevolent but giving a subsidy is costly. Let ¹(1;1) denote
the proportion of experienced private agents (private agents in state z = 1) who
decide to specialize(x = 1). Thenthe government's payo® function canbe written
as
v
b(y;¹) = ¹(1;1)(1 +(1 ¡ k)y)¡ c¹
X(1)
where k > 1 is the unit cost of raising funds to pay the subsidies.
The following table summarizes the payo®s to the private agents. The column
entries are combinations of actions and individual values of the state variable of
the small player (z;x); the row entries denote actions of the large player.
(0;0) (0;1) (1;0) (1;1)
y = 0 0 ¡c 0 ¹X
t (1)¡ c
y = 1 0 ¡c 0 ¹X
t (1) + 1¡ c
Let c < ± < 1. Under policy y = 0 the private agents will specialize (x = 1)
only if enough other small players specialize. Under policy y = 1 there is a reward
for experienced agents who specialize.
The government would like to play policy y = 0 in every period and would
like all small players to specialize (choose action 1). However this is not the only





1 if t · ¿
0 if t > ¿
for ¿ ¸ 0 is an aggregate best response. In particular ¹X
t (1) = 0 for all t is the
worst aggregate best response.
Now suppose the government plays y = (0;:::;0;1;0;:::;0;1;:::), where the
sequence of consecutive 0's is arbitrarily large. Whenever the government gives
71a subsidy (y = 1 is played) in period ¿ every small player wants to specialize
(x¿ = 1) and be experienced (z¿ = 1). But this implies that in period ¿ ¡ 1 every
small player has to specialize (x¿¡1 = 1), otherwise he would not be experienced
in the following period. This in turn implies that also in period ¿ ¡1 every small
player can bene¯t from specialization (x¿¡1 = 1) as long as he is experienced
(z¿¡1 = 1). But to be experienced in period ¿ ¡ 1 (z¿¡1 = 1) he has to specialize
in ¿ ¡ 2 (x¿¡2 = 1) and so on.
Thus every small player will choose xt = 1 for t · ¿, which implies that the
unique equilibrium is ¹X
t = 1, for all t. In order to guarantee that the private
agents will actually specialize (x = 1) thelarge player has togive a subsidy (switch
to policy y = 1) every once in a while. ²
Theorem 4 relied on the fact that we could ¯nd a uniform bound T such
that the large player's actions more than T periods from now did not a®ect the
small players' current behavior. The previous example shows that in the case
with strategic externalities such a uniform bound does not exist8. This creates a
problem for a large player who tries to exploit his reputations: the small players
may have to be convinced that the large player follows a given strategy for very
many future periods.
As an illustration, consider again Example 2. Suppose that the large player
wants toestablishareputationfor playingthesequencey = (A;B;A;A;B;A;A;A;B;:::).
Clearly ¹X
t (1) = 1 is the unique aggregate ² best response to y. However, to en-
sure that this best response is played in period t, ¼
y;Tt
t , with Tt ! 1 has to be
su±ciently large. If Tt goes to in¯nity very fast then the large player may actually
never be able to establish a su±ciently \far-reaching" reputation so that the small
8In other words: the aggregate ² best response fails to be lower hemi continuous in the
product topology.
72players will play ¹X
t (1) = 1.
To circumvent this problem we will assume that by committing to an \eventu-
ally periodic" sequence the large player can do almost as well as by committing to
an arbitrary sequence. This allows us to restrict the Stackelberg type to a set of
strategies for which we can ¯nd a uniform bound on the number of future periods
that matter for the current behavior of the small players.
Recall that a pure strategy y for b is called simple, if y ´ y, for some y 2 Y 1;
i.e. no matter what history is reached in period t, player b chooses yt in period
t. De¯ne a simple strategy L periodic if for some l;k · L, L < 1, we have
yt+l = yt for all t ¸ k. Let Y (L) denote the set of L periodic simple strategies.
The following assumption says that by committing to an L periodic sequence, the
large player can guarantee himself almost the same payo® as by committing to an
arbitrary sequence.
Assumption 10 For all ´ > 0;² > 0, there is an L such that for all y;¸ there is
a y0 2 Y (L) such that inf¹2E²(y0;¸) ¹ V b(y0;¹;¸) ¸ inf¹2E²(y;¸) ¹ V b(y;¹;¸) ¡ ´:
Note that Assumption 10 is satis¯ed in Example 2.
Commitment types (Stackelberg types) are constructed analogous to the ones
in Section 4.4. The only di®erence is that we restrict the Stackelberg type to the
use of L periodic sequences. Let y(²;´;¸) 2 Y (L) satisfy
inf
¹2E²(y(²;´;¸);¸)
¹ V b(y(²;´;¸);¹;¸) ¸ ¹ V b(²;¸)¡ ´
Assumption 10 guarantees the existence of such a sequence. As before we de¯ne





1 if t = 1
µt¡1 + 1 if µt¡1 < T or if ¹t¡T 2 E²
t¡T(y(²;´;¸t¡µt¡1);h¿¡T)
1 otherwise
73Type !(²;´;T) is committed to the strategy:
yt(ht) = yµt(²;´;¸t¡µt)
The interpretation of this strategy is the same as the one that was provided for
the case with no strategic externality.
Theorem 5 Suppose that Assumptions 7,9, and 10 hold. In any Nash equilibrium
(¾;¹) for initial state ¸, lim¯!1V b(¯;¾;¹;¸) ¸ ¹ V b.
Theorem 5 generalizes Theorem 4 to include the possibility of the small player's
payo® to depend on the aggregate play of the small players. If Assumption 10
holds, then Theorem 5 says that as the discount factor of the large player goes to
1 in any equilibrium he gets at least the time average of payo®s corresponding to
an optimal commitment.
4.6 Patient Small Players
In Theorem 4 we assumed that the discount factor of the small players stays ¯xed
while the large player becomes arbitrarily patient. In applications like policy
games the utility function of the large player frequently re°ects the utility func-
tion of the small players (e.g. the large player's preferences are identical to the
utility function of the \median voter"). Thus it is important to identify classes of
games where reputation allows the large player to achieve essentially his commit-
ment payo® when both the large and the small players become arbitrarily patient
simultaneously.
The di±culty in establishing a reputation with patient small players lies in the
fact that small players may become increasingly reluctant to take an action that
leads to an irreversible state as they get more patient. Thus to convince a very
74patient small player to take this action the large player may have to establish
a reputation for following the commitment strategy for very many periods and
hence it may take \too long" to establish a reputation that induces the small
players to enter an irreversible state.
4.6.1 The Failure of Reputation in the Durable Goods
Monopoly
The following simple example of a monopolist selling a durable good to a popu-
lation of buyers illustrates the failure of reputational arguments with irreversible
states.
Example 3 Suppose there are two types of buyers H and L. The reservation
price of type H, rH, for the durable good is 5, the reservation price of type L,
rL, is 2. There is mass 1/2 of both types of buyers. Each period the buyer takes
either action 0 (he does not buy) or action 1 (he buys). Similarly the state of
a buyer is either 0 (no purchase has occurred in the past) or 1 (a purchase has
occured in some previous period). Thus the transition function is de¯ned as:
f(xt;zt) =
(
0 if xt = 0 and zt = 0
1 otherwise
The monopolistsetsaprice pt everyperiod, wherept 2 f0;1=n;:::;(5n¡1)=ng;n ¸
6. If buyer i 2 fH;Lg purchases the durable good in period t then his payo® is





ri ¡ pt if zt = 0 and xt = 1
¡pt if zt = 1 and xt = 1
0 otherwise







t¡1 ¢ pt ¢ ¹t(1;0)
9We do not include ¹t(1;1) (the proportion of buyers that have already bought the durable
good in the past that do so again) because no buyer will purchase twice in equilibrium.
75Suppose there are three types of monopolists: one normal type characterized by
the payo® function above, type !¤ who sets pt = (5n ¡ 1)=n for all t and type ^ !
who follows the strategy:
pt =
(
(5n ¡ 1)=n if t · T
(2n ¡ 1)=n otherwise
where log(1=2)=log(±) < T < log(2=(3n + 1)))=log±. Both commitment types
have prior probability ² > 0.
The strategy of playing pt = (2n ¡ 1)=n (for the normal type) constitutes a
sequential equilibrium for large ±. To see this ¯rst note that pt = (2n ¡ 1)=n
constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the game where there is only
the normal type if ± is su±ciently large. Thus it remains to show that the normal
type does not have an incentive to imitate type !¤. Suppose b deviates and o®ers
pt = (5n ¡ 1)=n. Since
²
2 ¢ ²
¢ ±T ¢ (5¡ (2n ¡ 1)=n) > 1=n



















for n ¸ 6, where the ¯rst element of the chain of inequalities is an upper bound
on the payo® to b from deviating and the last is the payo® from setting p1 =
(2n ¡1)=n. This implies that deviation from p1 = (2n¡1)=n does not pay. Thus
in this game the large player is unable to exploit reputational e®ects to achieve
the simple monopoly payo® (5n ¡ 1)=2n.2
10The left hand side of the inequality is a lower bound on the expected payo® from waiting
until T + 1 and then buying at pT +1 = (2n ¡ 1)=n, and the right hand side is the payo® from
buying at (5n ¡ 1)=n at t = 1.
764.6.2 No Irreversible Actions
The following Assumption says that no action that the small players can take has
irreversible consequences.
Assumption 11 (Reversibility of Accumulation Paths) Suppose there is a se-
quence
(y1;:::;yN), (x1;:::;xN) such that for z1 = z and zn = f(yn;xn;zn¡1) we have
zN = z0. Then for any other sequence (^ y1; ^ y2;:::) there is a sequence (^ x1;::; ^ xN0)
such that for z1 = z0 and zn = f(^ yn; ^ xn;zn¡1) we have zN0 = z.
Using Assumption 11 we can partition the states Z into subsets Zj such that
the small players can only move between states in the same subset Zj and fur-
thermore there is an N such that for any pair (z;z0) belonging to the same Zj a
small player can move from z to z0 in fewer than N periods (independent of y).
Note that the de¯nition of aggregate ² best response (De¯nition 4) contains
strategies in which every small player \loses" ² units of utility as compared to a
best response every period. Since ± is ¯xed in Theorem 4, we can make ²=(1¡ ±)
arbitrarily small. (Note that ²=(1 ¡ ±) denotes the overall \loss" of utility of a
typical small player as compared to a best 1). Here we want to let ± ! 1 and
therefore we need a stronger notion of aggregate ² best response.
Denote by yT = (y1;:::;yT) a T period sequence of actions for the large player
and similarly ¹T = (¹1;:::;¹T);xT = (x1;:::;xT);zT = (z1;:::;zT). Finally let




t )g denote the set of sequences (xT;zT)
of length T that are feasible under yT. Now de¯ne a truncated aggregate ² best
response in the following way:
De¯nition 6 (Truncated Aggregate ² Best Responses) ¹T is a T-truncated ag-
gregate ² best response to yT for initial state ¸ if ¹TZ
t+1 = F(yT
t ;¹T
t );t = 1;:::;T ¡1























for all (x0T;z0T) 2 G(yT) with z0T
1 = zT
1. Let ET;²(yT;¸) denote the set of T-
truncated aggregate ² best responses to yT for initial state ¸.
This de¯nition of a truncated aggregate ² best response says that over the course
of T periods the average payo® could not be increased by more than ² by any
other sequence of actions. Note that this de¯nition requires ² optimality (in a
time average sense) over T periods and irrespective of the continuation of play
and hence is a much stronger notion of aggregate ² best response than the one
used in Theorems 4 and 5.
Next we de¯ne the limit of the commitment payo®s of a sequence of truncated
games. Considera truncatedgameinwhichthe largeplayercommits toanoptimal
sequence and the small players choose a truncated aggregate ² best response. ^ V b
denotes the limit ofpayo®s for the large player when the game is truncated farther
and farther away in the future. Again, since time averages need not converge, we
take the limit in¯mum. Let

















^ V b = lim²!0 ^ V (²).
Again we de¯ne a collection of commitment types who will allow the large
























The commitment type !(²;T) plays the optimal sequence in the T-period trun-
cated game given the initial state at the beginning of the truncated game.
Assumption 12 For all ² > 0 there is an ²0 < ² such that !(²0;T) 2 - has
strictly positive prior probability for every ¯nite T.
Theorem 6 says that if both players are very patient and if the transition function
is reversible then in any Nash equilibrium the large player will receive at least a
payo® that is close to the maximal time average in the T-period truncated game
for arbitrarily large T.
Theorem 6 Suppose Assumptions 7, 8, 11, and 12 hold and all players have a
common discount factor ±. Then in any Nash equilibrium (¾;¹) for initial state
¸, lim±!1V b(±;¾;¹;¸) ¸ ^ V b.
The idea behind the proof of Theorem 6 is that we split up the in¯nite game into
¯nite \superstage games" of length T. Note that the e®ect of a current decision
of a small player on the payo®s in future \superstage" games can be \undone"
in N periods or less by the reversibility assumption. If N is small as compared
to T then the small players will behave almost like short lived players in every
superstage game, i.e. they will behave essentially as if they were alive only for
one superstage game. Therefore the large player can exploit his reputation if he
convinces the small players that he will follow the commitment strategy in the
current superstage game. Thus it is su±cient for the large player to establish a
reputation for a bounded number of future periods and Lemma 1 shows that this
can be accomplished in ¯nitely many periods.
794.7 Conclusions
Whenever current play a®ects future payo® opportunities, agents' current deci-
sions depend not only on present but also on future expected behavior of their
opponents.
To describe this situation an in¯nite dynamic game between a large player
and a continuum of small players has been studied and it has been shown that
the use of reputational arguments allows to characterize the set of equilibria by
providing a lower bound on the equilibrium payo®s to the large player. This has
been accomplished by noticing that, if there is uncertainty relative to the type of
the large player, the large player can actually establish a reputation for behaving
in a certain way in a ¯nite horizon.
An example has been presented to show that when individual small players'
payo®s also depend on the aggregate play of the small players, it is possible that
arbitrarily distant play of the large player a®ects current aggregate behavior of
the small players. Interestingly it turns out that even in cases like this reputa-
tional arguments do have a bite: it is argued that the large player can establish a
reputation for playing repeatedly an appropriate ¯nite sequence of actions which
in turn allows him to get at least his commitment payo®.
Provided that the small players' actions do not have irreversible consequences,
reputational arguments have been shown to work independently of the rate of
patience of the small players. Even when the large player and the small players
have the same discount factor (like in the case of a benevolent government), the
fact that the large player can establish a reputation for playing a strategy that
depends on the aggregate state variable only after a su±ciently long adjustment
lag provides a lower bound on the large player's equilibrium payo®s.
A simple example of a durable goods monopoly problem has been presented
80to illustrate the role of the assumption that the small players' actions do not have
irreversible consequences: when some action pro¯le leads to an absorbing state
(purchase ofthedurablegoodin this case), then, ifthe small players are arbitrarily
patient, the possibility of establishing a reputation may fail to improve the large
player's payo® since no ¯nite adjustment lag in the strategy of the large player
would convince an arbitrarily patient small player to play a best response to the
optimal commitment strategy. Only in a case like this is it possible that payo®s
that are not close to the large player's optimal commitment payo® be equilibrium
payo®s of the perturbed game.
4.8 Proofs:
4.8.1 Proof of Lemma 8
Lemma 8 Let 0 < ¹ ¼ < 1 and suppose that p¤ > 0, and that (¾;¹) are such that























t(ht)j!¤) = 1 and that the denominator of (4.1) is equal to
Pr(y¤







Notice that for any ¿, Pr(yt = y¤
t(ht)) = Pr(yt0 = y¤
t0(ht0);t0 = t;:::;t +
¿ ¡ 1) + Pr(y¤
t(ht);yt0 6= y¤
t0(ht0); for some t0 = t + 1;:::;t + ¿ ¡ 1). Recall
81¼¤¿
t = Pr(yt0 = y¤
t0(ht0);t0 = t;:::;t+ ¿ ¡ 1), and let ¹ ¼¤¿
t = Pr(yt = y¤
t(ht);yt0 6=
y¤
t0(ht0); for some t0 = t+1;:::;t+¿ ¡1), i.e. ¹ ¼¤¿
t is the probability that the large
player's play is in accordance with y¤ at time t, but di®er at some point in the








t · ¹ ¼ for all t0 = t;:::;t+ ¿ ¡ 1. Then if the large player plays
like the commitment type for t0 = t;:::;t + ¿ ¡ 1 (i.e. yt0 = y¤
t0(ht0)), then the
probability that he is type !¤ has to go up by a factor of at least 1=¹ ¼ (because if
yt0 = y¤
t0(ht0) all t0 = t;:::;t+¿ ¡ 1, then at some t0 = t;:::;t+ ¿ ¡1 ¹ ¼¤¿
t will be





t · ¹ ¼ for ¿K periods during which yt = y¤(ht), all t, then
Pr(!¤jhK¢¿+1) ¸ p¤=¹ ¼K:
However, since
Pr(!
¤jht) · 1 (4.3)
if
p¤=¹ ¼K > 1 (4.4)
inequality (4.3) is violated and a contradiction to the hypothesis that ¼¤¿
t · ¹ ¼ for
all t0 = t;:::;t+ K ¢ ¿ ¡ 1 is obtained.
Taking the log of (4.4) the condition becomes
K > logp¤=log¹ ¼
and the proof is complete. 2
824.8.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4 Suppose that Assumptions 7, 8 and 9 hold. Then in any Nash
equilibrium (¾;¹) for initial state ¸, lim¯!1V b(¯;¾;¹;¸) ¸ ¹ V b.
The strategy of the proof will be to show that if the large player imitates the
Stackelberg type !(´;²;T) for appropriately chosen T, then eventually the small
players will play a best response to the Stackelberg strategy.
In the following we present a Lemma that shows that if the small players
believe that the large player follows a given sequence of actions for a su±cient
number of periods with a su±ciently large probability, then the small players will
play an aggregate ² best response to this sequence of actions.
For a pure strategy y, let ¼
yT
t be the probability that y is played in each of
the next T periods, i.e. in the periods t;t+1;t+ 2;:::;t+ T ¡ 1.
Lemma 9 Suppose Assumptions 7 and 8 hold. For every ² > 0 and T > (log ²
2 ¡
log¹ v)=log±, there is an ® such that for every simple strategy y, if ¼
yT
t > 1¡ ®,
then in equilibrium ¹t 2 E²
t(y;¸) for all ¸ and all t.
Proof: In the case with no strategic externality to prove that ¹t 2 E²
t(y;¸) it
su±ces to show that for all (x;z) 2 supp¹t, x 2 B²
t(y;z) (the aggregate action ¹
has been dropped as an argument of B(:) since by Assumption 8 v is independent
of ¹).
Choose a T such that
±
T¹ v < ´
or, taking logs,
T >
log´¡ log ¹ v
log±
:
Let xt 2 B²
t(y;z) and x0
t 62 B²
t(y;z). Let Vt be the expected payo® along the
equilibrium path if xt is chosen in period t and the player behaves optimally
83otherwise and let V 0
t be the expected payo® along the equilibrium path if x0
t is
chosen and the player behaves optimally otherwise. Then
Vt ¡ V 0
t ¸ (1 ¡ ®)² ¡ ®¹ v¡ ´ (4.5)
Note that this inequality holds independent of the particular choice of xt and x0
t.
To show that an ² best response to y is played in equilibrium we need to show
that there is an ® such that Vt¡V 0
t > 0. From (4.5) a su±cient condition for that
to happen is:
(1¡ ®)² ¡ ®¹ v¡ ´ > 0 (4.6)
For ´ < ²=2 there is an ® such that (4.6) is satis¯ed and the Lemma follows. 2
Lemma 9 shows that if the small players believe that the large player will
play a given sequence of actions for a su±ciently long period of time with a 0
high probability, then they will play an aggregate ² best response to it. Lemma 8
on the other hand showed that if the large player played a certain strategy long
enough then the small players would become convinced that he will continue to
play that strategy for the following T periods with an arbitrarily high probability.
The following Lemma applies Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 to the Stackelberg strat-
egy described above to show that in all but a ¯nite number of periods the small
players will play an aggregate ² best response to an optimal sequence if the large
player imitates a Stackelberg type.
Let T ¤ > (log
²
2 ¡ log ¹ v)=log± and let y¤ denote the strategy played by com-
mitment type !(²;´;T¤). Let H¤ be the set of histories consistent with y¤ being
played by b. Further let
H
¤
t (²;´;¸) = fh 2 H
¤
t jy = y(²;´;¸);¹ 2 E
²(y(²;´;¸));¸1 = ¸g
be the histories for which the sequence y(²;´;¸) and an aggregate ² best response
to this sequence have been played.
84Lemma 10 Suppose h 2 H¤. Then there is a number N, independent of h, such
that the number ofperiods forwhich ¹t 62 E²
k(y(²;´;¸);hk), forall hk 2 H¤
k(²;´;¸),
for all k · t and for all ¸ is bounded by N with probability 1.
Proof: For the proof of this Lemma we keep (²;´) ¯xed and therefore we will drop
(²;´) as arguments iny(:) and H¤(:). Supposethat forall k · t, ¹t 62 E²
k(y(¸);hk),
hk 2 H¤
k(¸). Then there is a t0 2 (t ¡ T +1;:::;t) such that ¼¤T
t0 < (1¡ ®) since
otherwise htnht0 2 H¤
t¡t0(¸t0) for some 0 · t0 · t and hence the large player will
continue to play y(¸t0) for the next T periods with probability greater than 1¡®
and therefore Lemma 9 implies that ¹t 2 E²
k(y(¸);hk).
But ¼¤T
t < (1 ¡ ®) at most T
logp¤
log(1¡®¤) times with probability 1 (Lemma 8).
Thus N · T 2 logp¤
log(1¡®¤) with probability 1. 2
The followingLemma says that by imitating thecommitment typeconstructed
in the section 4.4 the large player can get a payo® at least ¹ V(²) ¡ ´. Since ² and
´ are arbitrary Lemma 11 proves Theorem 4.
Lemma 11 Suppose Assumptions 7 and 8 hold. Further suppose that !¤(²;´) has
prior probability p¤ > 0 then in any Nash equilibrium (¾;¹) for initial state ¸,
lim¯!1V b(¯;¾;¹;¸) ¸ ¹ V b(²)¡ ´:
Proof: Consider the strategy for b of always following y¤ (corresponding to !¤ =
!(²;´;T)). Then ¹t 62 E²
k(y(²;´;¸);hk) for fewer than N periods by Lemma 3.










1 = ¸ and let vt = inf¸vt(¸). Then a lower bound for b's Nash equilibrium
payo® can be described as:
vt1 +0 +¯t1+1vt2 +::: + ¯t1+:::+tN¡1+N¡1vtN +0 +¯t1+:::+tN+Nv1 ¸
85¸ v
t + 0+ ¯
t+1v





for some t where 0 · t · 1. Then
V b(¯;¾;¹;¸) ¸ vt(1+ ¯t+1 +¯2(t+1) + ::: +¯(N¡1)(t+1)) + ¯N(t+1)v1
¸ vt+1(1+ ¯t+1 + ¯2(t+1)+ ::: + ¯(N¡1)(t+1))+ ¯N(t+1)v1
¡¯t+1(1¡ ¯)¹ v(1+ ¯t+1 + ¯2(t+1) +¯(N¡1)(t+1))
= v
t+11¡ ¯N(t+1)

















V b(¯;¾;¹;¸) ¸ ^ vt+1(1¡ ¯N(t+1)) +¯N(t+1)v1 ¡ ¯t+1¹ v
1 ¡ ¯N(t+1)
1¡ ¯t+1 (1¡ ¯) (4.8)
Now we want to let ¯ ! 1. Notice that the t that appears in (4.8) is a function
of ¯. If t(¯) stays bounded by some T < 1 as ¯ ! 1, then the ¯rst and the last
term (4.8) tend to zero and the result follows since
lim
¯!1
¯N(t+1)v1 ¸ ¹ V b(²) ¡ ´:
If t(¯) does not stay bounded as ¯ ! 1, i.e. t(¯) ! 1, then we have for some
0 · µ · 1:
lim
¯!1V




1 ¸ ¹ V
b(²) ¡ ´
since both liminf¯!1 ^ vt(¯)+1 and lim¯!1v1 are greater than or equal to V (²)¡ ´.
2
4.8.3 Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5 Suppose that Assumptions 7,9, and 10 hold. In anyNash equilibrium
(¾;¹) for initial state ¸, lim¯!1V b(¯;¾;¹;¸) ¸ ¹ V.
86First we will need a preliminary Lemma.




1j < ´, then ¹0
1 2 E²
1(¾;¸).
Proof: ¹1 2 E
³
1(¾;¸) means that there exists a ¹ 2 E³(¾) : ¹1(h1) = ¹1, where
h1 = ¸. Moreover for each realization of y 2 Y 1, ¹ implies a ¹ 2 M1. Clearly
we can construct a ¹0 such that for each realization of y 2 Y 1 we get a ¹0 2 M1
with j¹0 ¡ ¹j1 < ´. By the de¯nition of aggregate ² best response there exists a
¹00
1 with j¹00







1 ¡ ¹1j = j¹0
1 ¡ ¹1(h1)j < ´ we have j¹0
1 ¡ ¹00
1j < ´ + ³. By







which means that ¹0
1 2 E²
1(¾;¸). 2
The next Lemma is a weaker version of Lemma 9 for the case where v depends
on ¹. Recall that for a pure strategy y, ¼
yT
t denotes the probability that y is
played in each of the next T periods, i.e. in the periods t;t+ 1;t +2;:::;t+ T.
Lemma 12 Given ² > 0, for every L there is a (T;®) such that for ¼
yT
t > 1¡ ®
then in equilibrium for all y 2 Y(L), ¹t 2 E²
t(y;ht) where (T;®) is independent
of t;ht.
Proof: Note that since Y (L) contains a ¯nite number of elements and since
(yt;yt+1;:::) 2 Y(L) if y 2 Y(L) it is su±cient to show that for every pure
strategy y we ¯nd a (T;®) such that if ¼
yT
1 > 1¡ ®, then ¹1 2 E²
1(y;¸), for all ¸.
Let §T(y;®) = f¾jy1;:::;yT is played with probability 1 ¡ ®g. If ¼
T;y
1 > 1 ¡ ®
then in equilibrium ¹ 2 E(¾;¸) for some ¾ 2 §T(y;®).
87Let (¾T) be a sequence such that ¾T 2 §T(y;®T);®T ! 0 as T ! 1. Let
(¹¤T;¸T) be a sequence such that ¹¤T 2 E(¾T;¸T) and let ¹¤ = ¹(h¤) where h¤
is the history where ¾t = yt for all t.
Claim: If ¹¤;¸ is a limit point of (¹¤T);¸T, then ¹¤ 2 E(y;¸).
Pf: Suppose ¹¤ 62 E(y;¸). Then there is a ¿ and a set D ½ Z £ X with
P
(z;x)2D¹¤(z;x) > ° > 0 and for all (z;x) 2 D
x 62 B¿(y;¹¤;h¿;z)





Choose T such that
±T¹ v · ´=2
Since ¹¤T
t0 ! ¹¤
t0 uniformly for t0 · ¿ + T and since ®T ! 0 as ¾T ! y, by
continuity of v in ¹ and in ® at ® = 0, it follows that for large T and for (z;x) 2 D







However, for large T, j¹¤T
¿ ¡ ¹¤
¿j < °=2 and hence (4.9) contradicts the fact that
¹¤T 2 E(¾T;¸T). ²
Next we want to show that as T ! 1 the distance between the ¯rst element
of an aggregate best response to ¾T, ¹T
1 2 E1(¾T;¸), and the set of ¯rst elements
of the aggregate ³ best response to y, E
³
1(y;¸), tends to zero. More precisely,
we want to show that for all (³;´) there exists a T¤ such that for all T > T¤ for











1 ¡ ¹j · ´:













1 ¡ ¹j = 0:
From above we know that ¹¤;¸ a limit point of a sequence ¹T;¸T with ¹T 2
E(¾T;¸T) has to belong to E(y;¸) µ E³(y;¸) which implies that the limit above
is zero.
This implies (by Lemma 0) that by choosing ´ and ³ appropriately, ¹T
1 2
E²
1(y;¸) for T > T¤, for all ¸. 2
Proof of Theorem 5: Let !(´;²) = !(²;´;T¤) denote the commitment type
that plays the Stackelberg strategy described above, where T ¤ satis¯es Lemma 5
uniformly for all y 2 Y (L) and L is chosen su±ciently large so that there is a
y(²;´;¸) 2 Y(L) for all ¸. Now we can apply Lemma 10. Given that Lemma 10
holds so does Lemma 11. Note that ´;² can be chosen arbitrarily by Assumption
9. Thus Lemma 11 proves Theorem 2. 2
4.8.4 Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6 Suppose Assumptions 7, 8, 11, and 12 hold and all players have a
common discount factor ±. Then in any Nash equilibrium (¾;¹) for initial state
¸, lim±!1V b(±;¾;¹;¸) ¸ ^ V b.








t (²;¸);¹t) ¸ ^ V b(¸;²)¡ ´:
Note that for all ²;´ > 0 there is a T < 1 such that yT(²;¸) satis¯es the above
inequality for all ¸. This is the case since
j^ V
b(²;¸) ¡ ^ V
b(²;¸
0)j < ¹ v¢ j¸¡ ¸
0j
since v is independent of ¹11.
11The constant ¹ v is the upper bound on the payo®s of the small and the large players (As-
sumption 7).
89Step 2: Claim Let y be a given pure strategy. Independent of y, for any ² > 0
there are ® > 0 and ¹ ± < 1 and a T < 1, such that if the probability that y is
followed in the ¯rst T periods is greater than 1¡ ®, then for all 1 ¸ ± ¸ ¹ ± in any











































with z1 = z.
There are 3 reasons why a small player may not want to play an element in
BT;²(y;z). First, y will only be followed with probability 1¡ ®; second, playing
a best response may cause the player to reach a state in period T which is not
the optimal state for the play thereafter and third, the player discounts future
payo®s, instead of using the time-average criterion.
Let
PT
t=1±t¡1vt be theexpectedpayo® ofthe small player alongthe equilibrium
path in the next T periods and let zT+1 be the state in which player i is in period




t¡1vt · (1 ¡ ®)(v


















On the other hand, the player can use the following sequence: for the ¯rst T ¡N
periods play a sequence that maximizes the average payo® in the ¯rst T periods
against y, in the last N periods, adjust the state so that in period T +1 the state
zT+1 is reached. This gives a lower bound on the payo®:
T X
t=1














¯ ¡ ¹ v
N
T
90Now note that if T is large and ® is close to zero and ± is close to one then
the prescribed strategy is an element in B²;T(y;z). Furthermore it gives a larger
payo® than any strategy that is not an element of B²;T(yT) since



















But this implies that for all (zt;xt)T
t=1 2 supp(¹1;:::;¹T) such that zt+1 =
f(yt;zt;xt) we have (zt;xt)T
t=1 2 B²;T(y;z1), which proves the claim. ²
Step 3: Let ¹ denote the sequence of (¹t) induced by the history when player
b imitates the type !(²;T) and let ¼¤T
t be the probability that y(²;T) is played
in the periods t;t + 1;:::;t + T ¡ 1. For every ® > 0, ¼¤T
kT+1 < 1 ¡ ® for fewer
than N(®;T) di®erent k (Lemma 8). Thus for all but N(®;T) di®erent k we have
(¹kT+1;:::;¹kT+T) 2 E²;T(yT(²;¸kT+1);¸kT+1). But this implies that for all but
N periods of length T the undiscounted payo® of b is larger than ^ V b(²)¡´. Since
²;´ can be chosen arbitrarily small (Assumption 12), the Theorem follows. 2
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